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Abstract. This paper uses micro data from four OECD countries (the United States, Spain, Italy, and 
the Netherlands), to assess the determinants of household debt holding and to investigate whether or 
not credit constraints are important for household debt holding. We extend the existing literature in 
important ways. First, we present comparative evidence for four countries at the micro level, where we 
rely on household panel data for two countries; we are thus able to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity via individual household effects and to track changes in household behaviour over time. 
Second, by making data across countries as comparable as possible, we can explore the importance of 
the differences in institutional settings for debt incidence, debt outstanding and credit constraints. We 
also explore the implications for debt holding from consumption models, including a numerically 
solved precautionary savings model. We find that inter-country differences are substantial and remain 
even after controlling for a host of observable characteristics. This points to institutional differences 
between the countries being important. 
 
 
Acknowledgements: This paper was written while the authors were visting the Finance and 
Consumption in the European Union Program at the European University Institute in Florence. We 
thank Finance and Consumption for their support and hospitality. Crook would also like to thank the 
Carnegie Trust for the Universities of Scotland for financial support for this research. We thank Rob 
Alessie, Richard Disney, Rob Euwals, Tullio Jappelli, Tansel Yilmazer, Ernesto Villanueva, seminar 
audiences at CPB The Hague, Universities of Copenhagen, Edinburgh, and Nottingham, and 
conference audiences at Vienna (European Economic Association), Florence, and Madrid for insightful 
comments. We thank Centerdata for providing Dutch panel data, and in particular Klaas de Vos for 
help with wealth data. 
 
 
Correspondence to: jonathan.crook@ed.ac.uk and shochguertel@feweb.vu.nl. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
After the summer of 2007, credit to households has shifted into the focus of 
policymakers and the banking industry alike. What began with rising default rates in 
the US subprime mortgage market, may develop into a global credit crisis. European 
banks already face the consequences of borrowers being unable to service their 
contracts on time. In turn, central banks see their scope of action severely constrained, 
and the macroeconomic implications of these recent developments may be very far-
reaching. 
 
Against this background, we provide a systematic international comparison of 
household debt holding and of access to credit, using microeconomic data that allow 
us to trace the evolution of debt and to assess constraints over the past one-and-a-half 
decades. Whilst current media attention is directed at whether access to borrowing has 
been too easy for some households, the academic literature has debated for a long 
time whether financial markets institutions may have inefficiently constrained 
household borrowing, and whether policy ought not to remove or ease such 
constraints. 
 
Household debt holding has indeed increased substantially over the last decades in 
many OECD countries, both in terms of the total amount outstanding and relative to 
incomes, household debt portfolios have become more diversified. Have borrowing 
constraints become a non-issue? 
 
We argue in this paper that this is not necessarily the right conclusion, based on 
analysis and comparison of micro data on household debt holding from four OECD 
countries that display very different patterns of debt holding and where credit 
constraints seem to play very different roles. Whereas we do find strong time trends, 
between-country differences remain very stark and appear empirically more important 
than within-country changes over time. These pertinent patterns suggest that 
institutions that shape demand and supply in credit markets play an important role, 
and we document substantial institutional differences between countries. 
  
Very few studies have examined international differences in the volume of household 
debt or in credit constraints. Jappelli and Pagano (1989) started by analysing any 
excess sensitivity of consumption expenditure to current income in an international 
comparison. They interpret their findings in the light of institutional differences across 
seven countries, and relate implied differences in the demand and supply of loans to 
variation in the severity of liquidity constraints. Bacchetta and Gerlach (1997) used 
aggregate data for five OECD countries to find that overall consumption expenditure 
shows excess sensitivity with respect to both mortgage and consumer credit and that 
the wedge between borrowing and lending rates is significantly related to 
consumption in three of the five countries. 
 
But the aggregate data employed say nothing about heterogeneous responses in the 
population to policy variation and changes in demand and supply conditions. Most 
empirical results based on micro data relate to the United States (Jappelli 1990, 
Crook, Thomas and Hamilton  2001, Duca and Rosenthal 1993, Lyons 2004, Cox and 
Jappelli 1993, Ferri and Simon 2002) although there is some research for Italy (Fabbri 
and Padula, 2004 and Magri 2002) and also for Australia (La Cava and Simon 2003). 
Several researchers have examined the determinants of household demand for debt 
and again the only countries considered are the US and Italy (see Crook, 2006 for a 
survey). The single-country evidence suggests that the incidence of credit constraints 
differs considerably between countries. 
 
This paper has two main aims and contributions. First, we compare the determinants 
of household level credit constraints across four OECD countries over the last 15 
years: the United States, Spain, Italy, and the Netherlands. We use panel data for the 
latter two and repeated cross sections for the United States. We also present the first 
evidence on debt and credit constraints from the first wave of a new Spanish survey. 
The micro data that have been analysed so far are typically not longitudinal and no 
study has yet provided international comparisons of the determinants of credit 
constraints and the demand for household debt using micro data directly. The data we 
use have gained international recognition for being among the most reliable sources 
for measuring household assets and liabilities. We expend large efforts to make the 
data as comparable as possible in terms of variable definitions, and we document 
common trends. In all countries we rely on self-reports on whether or not households’ 
credit applications have been turned down or whether households felt discouraged 
from applying for credit. Second, our results bear on parts of the consumption 
literature, as we find strong patterns in the data that are consistent with standard 
models deriving from the permanent income hypothesis. To be specific, we find the 
demand for credit to respond negatively to an increase in a positive difference 
between current and (a measure of) permanent income in two of the four countries. 
 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we sketch and 
numerically solve a consumption model that allows us to explore determinants of the 
demand for credit in the face of credit constraints. In Section 3, we discuss the way in 
which institutions may impact on observed credit behaviour (both demand and 
supply), and we discuss in detail institutional differences between countries. Section 4 
introduces the data used, and Section 5 describes the distribution of debt outstanding 
in the different countries. Section 6 sketches empirical strategies, Section 7 briefly 
comments on estimators used and presents results on credit application, credit 
constraints, and household debt holding. Section 8 concludes. 
 
2. Theory of Credit Constraints 
 
We consider the standard intertemporal choice framework to make clear how liquidity 
constraints can be important determinants of household credit behaviour. We start 
without such constraints. A consumer allocates his life-time earnings to consumption 
expenditure tc  over time. Under intertemporal separability and exponential 
discounting, he maximizes the value function at age t and with horizon T,  
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where tE  denotes the expectations operator conditional on information at time t, u 
denotes instantaneous felicity and β  is a factor used to discount the future with δ  
being the rate of time preference, 1)1( −+= δβ . Denote (stochastic) earnings by ty . 
There is a single asset A with a single, fixed return R=1+r. The behavioural equation 
that drives consumption demand and implies asset and debt holding is the Euler 
equation 
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The level of consumption is determined from here together with a constraint on assets 
in the final period. We assume 0=TA . Absent further restrictions on either utility or 
income processes (or both), closed form solutions for optimal consumption do not 
exist.  
 
Under the parameterization of the Certainty Equivalence version of Friedman’s 
permanent income hypothesis (PIH), some explicit solutions have been derived (see 
e.g. Deaton, 1992). Here, consumers’ time preference rate equals the interest rate, 
1=Rβ , and instantaneous felicity functions u are quadratic in consumption. In that 
case, marginal utility is linear and consumption follows a martingale, 1+= ttt cEc . A 
closed-form solution for optimal consumption can be obtained. Consumption will 
equal permanent income, ptY , which is defined to correspond to the annuity value of 
future earnings and capital income. Kapteyn, Alessie and Lusardi (2005) show the 
dependency of current assets on income realizations and expectation errors: 
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where sss yEy 1;1 −=ε  is the period-1 expectation error of period-s income. This 
equation shows how unexpected deviations from income translate into asset or debt 
changes. The notional demand for debt arises out of 0<tA . With a hump-shaped 
earnings profile over the life cycle, a household would be expected to borrow when 
relatively young and dissave in retirement. Since an unexpected change in income will 
affect permanent income only by its annuity value, borrowing is more sensitive to 
income shocks than consumption. The latter reacts mainly to permanent shocks, the 
former also to transitory shocks.  
 
To illustrate further, assume that income is certain and grows at factor G between the 
years, until before retirement, 11
1
,...,1,
−
−
== R
t
t ttyGy , and drops to a constant fraction 
of last earnings Tttyy Rtt R ,...,,1 == −α in retirement. Then, assets (and hence debt) can 
be shown to evolve according to 
 
( ) 1,
1)1()()1(
2
111
1
1
0
−≤−−+
−






















−−−−
−
+−=
−
−−−+−
−
−
R
t
TttttT
t
tttTt
t
tt
r
GyRRRR
R
GRGR
gr
yARA
R
RR
R
α
κκ
 
 ( ) RtTttTtt
t
Tt
t tt
r
GyRRR
R
G
gr
yARA
R
RR
R
≥−−+−






















−
−
+−=
−
−−−−+
−
−
,11)1(
2
111
1
1
0
α
κ
 
 
                               (2.4) 
where )1( TR−−=κ . 
 
Since incomes are smooth during both working and retirement periods, assets will be 
smooth functions as well. Further assume the absence of inheritances, 00 =A . The 
model still allows for a number of very different asset paths, among which an initial 
period of borrowing, followed by positive assets that peak at the beginning of 
retirement and are then run down. Other scenarios are possible, including a household 
never borrowing or never having positive assets. Comparative statics can in principle 
be obtained by taking the derivatives with respect to the various parameters. While 
increasing retirement age or the replacement rate will reduce asset holdings (since 
there is less need to save for retirement), the demand for debt holding will increase. 
Income growth will likewise increase the demand for debt. If  income growth is 
sufficiently small or zero during working life, no debt will be held. (Income growth is 
nonpositive between periods 1−Rt  and Rt  due to 1≤α ). Further insights can be gained 
by solving the model numerically, or by further restricting some of the model’s 
parameters.  
 
Credit constraints in the sense that consumers are kept from borrowing despite their 
wanting to borrow at the given interest rate enter the model by adding additional 
lower bounds on current assets, BAt −≥ for every t, where 0≥B is the borrowing 
limit. If B is zero, no borrowing is possible, if 0>B , borrowing is possible against 
human capital to the extent that the loan is not collateralized. These rationing 
constraints have been motivated by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) from problems of 
asymmetric information. Competitive banks turn out to have an optimal interest rate if 
they are to maximize their rate of return on their lending portfolios. Taking into 
account the effects of adverse selection, a high enough lending rate will price the good 
risks out of the market, leaving the pool of borrowers dominated by worse risks (who 
might have a larger probability of defaulting on their loans). The optimal lending rate 
is set where the marginal cost incurred due to adverse selection balance off against the 
incremental profit that is possible with setting a higher rate. Sticking to this optimal 
rate may involve rationing of demand in equilibrium, and some borrowers will not be 
granted their loan applications despite them being observationally equivalent to 
others, given the interest rate.  
 
In consumption models, credit constraints are imposed as additional inequality 
constraints on the problem. Deaton (1991) writes the Euler equation as 
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where ttt yAx +=  is cash on hand. Note that borrowing constraints imply not only 
breaking the usual Euler equation between two periods when rationing is binding, but 
there is also an anticipatory effect on consumption (and hence borrowing) since 
liquidity constraints that may bind in the future can work through on present 
behaviour and encourage saving or reduce borrowing. Mariger (1987) stresses that 
such constraints effectively shorten the planning horizon. Figure 1 illustrates: the solid 
line shows consumption and assets in the absence of credit constraints, the dashed line 
imposes a nonzero borrowing limit: consumption smoothing leads to the effective 
period of binding constraints to be shorter than would have been the case if the 
consumer had been ‘surprised’. 
 
FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
More general models allowing for nonlinear marginal utility, such as constant relative 
risk aversion  
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(where γ measures risk aversion) imply that preference parameters whose impact the 
certainty equivalence formulation from above ignores are crucial determinants of 
borrowing behaviour (Carroll, 1997 and Deaton, 1991). If consumers are patient 
enough and sufficiently risk averse (thus, have a low elasticity of intertemporal 
substitution), they may be less inclined to borrow or would not want to borrow at all. 
In addition, as stressed by Carroll (1997), the stochastic properties of the income 
process will matter: If income can drop to zero with positive probability, even 
impatient consumers with steep income profiles may not want to borrow in order to 
avoid (in utility terms) ‘catastrophic’ outcomes. Since closed-form solutions are not 
available, we need to simulate the model in order to study the implications of 
parameter values and changes thereof. Income consists of the current realization of 
permanent income and a multiplicative transitory income shock tε . Note, that 
permanent income is—unlike in the certainty equivalence case—varying over time. 
Permanent income is modelled as an AR(1) process; it grows at rate G and is subject 
to a permanent shock tη , 
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Shocks are assumed to be lognormally distributed, with parameters εσ  and ησ  (and 
,5.0 2εε σµ −=  and ,5.0 2ηη σµ −= ). The model can be solved numerically by backward 
induction, where we determine the optimal consumption policy as a function of 
current cash-on-hand (see Deaton 1991 for details). Note, that standard references in 
the literature assume ∞→T  for computational purposes. Since that implies absence 
of a retirement period, we solve the model for finite T. Individuals retire at a fixed 
date Rt , upon which their incomes drop to a fraction α  of their last earned income. 
The latter however implies that known comparative statics are not available anymore, 
not least because income growth is negative at Rt  and zero thereafter. We study the 
model under absence and presence of an explicit borrowing constraint at B=0. 
 
Benchmark parameters are shown in Table 1, chosen in accordance with similar 
exercises done elsewhere in the literature. Table 2 shows debt holding patterns for this 
benchmark case and for cases where we deviated from the benchmark parameters by 
changing one parameter at a time since often a range of parameter values appears 
‘sensible’. 
 
TABLE 1 HERE 
 
TABLE 2 HERE 
 
All specifications show common patterns. For instance, the ratio of average debt to 
average income is slightly smaller than the mean of the individual debt to income 
ratio. The distributions of debt to income, both unconditional and conditional (on debt 
holding), are right skewed, and in (almost) all cases we observe a hump-shaped age 
pattern: the 40 year olds appear to hold most debt among all the displayed ages. The 
standard deviation of debt to income also peaks at age 40 or 50. This is driven by the 
generated heterogeneity due to income uncertainty in the model. Debt incidence is 
almost always monotonically decreasing with age. In addition, debt holding in 
retirement is rare and surfaces only in a few instances. 
 
The benchmark specification shows a decreasing age pattern in terms of debt 
incidence, with people of 30 years of age having an 81% chance of debt holding, 
decreasing to zero in retirement. At age 40, 73.4% of all individuals hold debt. 
Average debt holding amounts to about a quarter of annual income (both at the 
aggregate and individual level). Conditional on holding debt, the figure exceeds one 
third at that age. Note that in this benchmark case conditional debt holding increases 
when we go from age 50 to age 60. Apparently, the sample is then dominated by a 
few people that hold high debt balances.  
 
We also recalculate the model for the case that binding liquidity constraints at a lower 
bound of B=0 are imposed. If we define people to be constrained when their current 
cash on hand falls short of 110 percent of their consumption level at that age, we see 
that 17.6% of the 30 year olds are constrained as opposed to 2.5% of 40 year olds. 
This should be contrasted with the 81.1% and 73.4% of people that want to hold debt 
at these ages. Note that the difference between these figures is partly driven by the 
precautionary response: people that are liquidity constrained will want to build up 
additional buffers to stay away from the constraint. Thus, when people anticipate 
liquidity constraints in the future, they will be induced to save more and be less 
inclined to apply for credit (in this model, under a binding liquidity constraint, 
everybody who wants credit will also be denied). 
 
Deviating from the benchmark shows interesting patterns. The second panel of the 
Table considers cases where the retirement saving motive is varied. Decreasing the 
retirement replacement rate from 75% to 65% of last earned income reduces debt 
holding substantially. Even more remarkable, however, is the sensitivity of changes 
with respect to income growth. Reducing income growth from 2.0% to 1.5% percent 
slashes the demand for debt to close to zero. Conversely, increasing income growth to 
2.5% would result in almost every young household holding debt (not displayed in the 
Table). 
 
The third panel of the Table looks at changes in the precautionary response. We make 
either income less volatile, reducing the standard deviation of income shocks from 
10% to 7.5%, or we increase the curvature of marginal utility, by increasing risk 
aversion from 2 to 3. The former change increases debt holding by a large margin, the 
latter likewise decreases it. The effect of the change in risk aversion is comparable to 
the effect of the change in income growth. 
 
The last panel, finally, varies the return on assets and the time preference rate, one at a 
time. Increasing the interest rate has again quantitatively similar effects as decreasing 
income growth or increasing risk aversion. The result is not straightforward to 
interpret, however, since there are at least three effects at work. A substitution effect 
makes future consumption more attractive, thus stimulating saving, which may be 
partly offset by an income effect that raises future wealth through the return on assets 
(if assets are positive). Also, there is a human capital effect that reduces the present 
value of lifetime earnings, depressing consumption and stimulating asset 
accumulation. Finally, making the consumer more impatient has the anticipated result 
that debt holding increases substantially. 
 
 
3. Prima Facie Evidence and Institutional Differences between Credit Markets 
 
The previous section outlined how parameters of a consumer’s problem impact on the 
demand for credit and the likelihood of being credit constrained, once there are 
exogenous borrowing constraints. Yet, we expect and show below that there are 
substantial differences between countries remaining that are not easily explained by 
changes in those parameters. 
 
Instead, institutional factors (which the above model does not include) are likely 
important determinants of both supply and demand for debt, the incidence of holding 
debt and the incidence of credit constraints. Hence our strategy is similar to that of 
other studies that examine patterns between countries, such as Banks, Blundell and 
Smith (2003), Hurd and Kapteyn (2003), Kapteyn and Panis (2003), or Börsch-Supan 
and Lusardi (2003) in that we implicitly attribute the unexplained variation between 
countries to differences in institutions. 
 
This section discusses these factors and their implications, referring to the four OECD 
countries under study: the United States, Spain, Italy, and the Netherlands.  
 
There are three reasons why we choose these countries. Most importantly, there are 
substantial institutional and structural differences between these countries and so a 
comparison between them may give us a first idea as to the effects of these 
institutional differences. Second, there are substantial differences in the use of credit 
between the countries, some of which marking extremes within the OECD. Third, 
purely pragmatically, these are the only four countries for which a nationally 
representative survey collects data for self-reported credit constraints (Crook 2005). 
 
To illustrate the second point, refer to Table 3 presenting OECD data. The 
Netherlands is one of the highest consumer debt-laden countries in Europe and the 
western world whilst Italy is one of the lowest. The US is in this respect ‘closer’ to the 
Netherlands than to Italy. Spain, in turn, ranks just below the US. For example, of all 
OECD countries for which data is available in 2005, the Netherlands had the second-
highest level of household debt (including non-profit institutions) relative to 
disposable income (134%) whilst Italy had the lowest at 43%, the US ranked fourth 
with 111%, and Spain fifth with 94%. In terms of mortgage debt relative to GDP, the 
Netherlands has amongst the highest ratio in the world. The Dutch figure almost 
doubled from around 40% beginning of the 1990’s to 78.8% recently. Italy is at the 
other extreme, where mortgage levels did not exceed 5% during much of the last two 
decades, with increases to 11.4% only recently (2002). The US and Spain are in 
between—the mortgage-to-GDP ratio used to be highest among the three countries in 
the US (around 45% around a decade ago), but has not seen as steep increases as 
Holland (58% in 2002). Spanish mortgage debt relative to GDP has seen the most 
spectacular growth as figures almost tripled between 1992 and 2002, from 12% to 
32%. These (and similar) statistics suggest that these four countries span much of the 
between-country differences in debt holding in the OECD. 
 
TABLE 3 HERE 
 
In the remainder of this section we give a brief overview of institutional and structural 
factors that may result in differences in demand and supply (and so the volume) of 
debt held by households between the four countries. There is an array of potentially 
important institutional determinants, ranging from the way financial markets deal with 
problems of asymmetric information to provisions in the tax code to deduct interest 
payments on debt held. But also the organisation of the welfare state and consumers’ 
attitudes and perceptions may bear importantly on consumption behaviour and the 
derived demand for debt. 
 
3.1 Social Income Insurance and Perceptions of Income Risk 
 
Both Italy and the Netherlands value social security highly, albeit with different 
implementations of the social insurance and welfare state. Italy puts a strong emphasis 
on state old-age pensions, while spending very little on unemployment insurance, 
whereas the Netherlands spend a comparatively large share of their social budget on 
disability insurance (that partly masks long-term unemployability). For example, from 
OECD figures (Social Expenditure Database) we calculate that unemployment 
spending during the period 1990-2001 was on average 2.3% of GDP in the 
Netherlands, 2.2% in Spain, 0.9% in Italy and 0.4% in the US, with the maximum 
duration for such receipts being five years in the Netherlands, two years in Spain, but 
only six months for Italy and the US.  European countries know extensive national 
health care systems (with more emphasis on income-related private health insurance 
in the Dutch case). In the US, state pensions will make up most of social security. See 
Kapteyn and Panis (2003) and Börsch-Supan and Lusardi (2003), for more detail. 
Employment protection legislation is most stringent in Spain, followed by Italy and 
the Netherlands, least in the US.1 
                                               
1
 According to the OECD Employment Outlook 2004, the US receives an index value of 0.7 on a 0-6 
scale overall employment protection index and ranks last among 28 countries. Italy and the Netherlands 
have index numbers of 2.4 and 2.3 and rank 11 and 12, respectively, Spain ranks fourth with 3.1. 
Generally, laying off workers is comparatively easy in the US and relatively difficult in all the 
European countries. Yet, a substantial number of Spanish employees finds work via temporary 
contracts, whereas the Italian labour market is characterized by longer employment relations. Owing to 
institutional differences in wage setting, there is also much larger wage compression in European 
 The design and coverage of social insurances would imply a greater demand for debt 
for purposes of temporary consumption smoothing in the US compared to the 
Netherlands and finally, Spain and Italy. Similarly, ceteris paribus, with more 
employment security in Spain and Italy than in the Netherlands and the US one would 
expect the supply of credit to be in this rank order. 
 
Note, however that demand for credit for smoothing purposes also will depend on the 
perceived income uncertainty of consumers. Das and Donkers (1999) compare 
European (Italian and Dutch) estimates of subjective perceptions of income 
uncertainty with those of the US and find perceived income uncertainty in the 
Netherlands to lie between that reported in Italian and US studies. Guiso, Jappelli and 
Pistaferri (2002) focus on perceptions of unemployment risk instead. They, however, 
find the US and Italy ‘surprisingly similar’ in terms of the distribution of subjective 
unemployment probabilities. There is, to our knowledge, no comparative evidence for 
Spain on this matter. 
 
3.2 Bankruptcy Legislation and Usury Regulation 
 
Bankruptcy legislation can act as wealth insurance against adverse shocks and hence 
increase the demand for credit. Italian bankruptcy legislation (unchanged since 1942) 
does not have formal provision for a consumer to be discharged from bankruptcy, 
unless creditors accept his proposals for repayment. Spain has introduced a new 
bankrupty act coming into force per September 2004 and covering natural persons; 
the law does not explicitly refer to consumer bankruptcy, however. Likewise, in the 
Netherlands  discharge from bankruptcy for natural persons was not possible before 
1998. After that date, discharge was allowed, conditional on adhering to a court-
approved repayment plan lasting 2 or 3 years. In the US, a debtor can choose between 
declaring bankruptcy under Chapters 7 or 13 of the Federal Bankruptcy Act. Under 
the former, unsecured debts are discharged, the debtor turns over all assets to a 
Trustee but is not obliged to repay debts out of future earnings. Under Chapter 13 a 
debtor does not give up his assets but must propose a repayment plan acceptable to the 
debtors or a bankruptcy judge. Proposed repayments under Chapter 13 must be at 
least as much as under Chapter 7. While these differences may point to higher demand 
for debt for US households, supply may likewise be larger than in Italy or the 
Netherlands: White (2006) argues that the higher the exemption the higher the 
protection, the lower the chance of default and the greater the supply of credit. 
Exemptions are higher in the US than in Italy and the Netherlands.2  
 
                                                                                                                                       
countries as opposed to the US. Bertola and Rogerson (1997) investigate labour market turnover and 
wage compression in a number of countries, among which Italy and the US. 
2
 Note that empirical evidence for the US is equivocal as to whether an applicant is more likely to be 
turned down for credit in States where exemptions are high. Gropp et al. (1997) and Lin and White 
(2001) suggest they are, Berkowitz and Hynes (1999) suggest the opposite. Gropp et al. (1997) suggest 
that lenders increased supply to satisfy greater demand by high asset households in high exemption 
States, but did not increase supply to low asset households. If this were generalisable across countries, 
it would suggest that in the US there would be greater supply and demand by high asset households 
than in Europe, but that supply in the US would not be greater than in the European countries for low 
asset households. 
 
Usury laws that cap the interest rate a lender is allowed to set may be expected to 
remove or reduce the insurance facility for temporary income shocks that consumer 
borrowing provides (Glaeser and Scheinkman 1998), to reduce the supply of loans to 
high-risk applicants (Canner and Fergus 1987, Villegas 1989, Baxter 1995) and to 
reduce the extent of adverse selection and moral hazard. Yet, such limits appear to be 
of little practical importance in the 1990s in any of the countries under study. Usury 
limits were effective in many US States, in Spain, in the Netherlands, and (introduced 
in 1997) in Italy. However, these limits were typically too high to be binding (see 
Alessie, Hochguertel and Weber (2005) for the Italian case). 
 
3.3 Judicial Enforcement and Information Sharing 
 
The cost of lending, and with it the supply of loans is to some extent explained by the 
cost of recovering the principal from delinquent borrowers. The more efficient the 
judicial system to deal with such cases, the lower the cost. Djankov, La Porta and 
Lopez-de-Silanes (2003) report the duration of dispute resolution for two clinical 
court cases: collecting a bounced check and evicting a delinquent tenant, for 109 
countries. Their data convey that for the check case, Italy ranks 106 (645 days), Spain 
ranks 39 (147 days) Netherlands ranks 4 (39 days), the US ranks 7 (54 days); for 
eviction, Italy ranks 101 (630 days), Spain ranks 51 (183 days), the US ranks 7 (49 
days), the Netherlands rank 9 (52 days).  
 
Similarly, the data presented in Bianco, Jappelli and Pagano (2005) show a close 
similarity in terms of judicial efficiency between the Netherlands and the US at one 
end of the spectrum, and Italy and Spain on the other. Italy and Spain have long 
foreclosure proceedings on mortgages and low judicial efficiency along with a low 
ratio of mortgage debt to GDP and a high downpayment ratio, the reverse holding true 
in the Netherlands and the US. 
 
Jappelli and Pagano (2002) assess the depth of credit information sharing across many 
countries, accomplished by credit bureaus. These issue on average 2.3 reports per 
citizen per year in the US, 0.64 in Holland, and 0.046 in Italy. Data on Spain are not 
available. Both positive (outstanding debt and number of credit, assets held, bank 
relationships and so forth) and negative (repayment delinquencies, default, arrears) 
information are collected by such agencies. Since information sharing may limit 
adverse selection and moral hazard, and also increase competition, the Italian credit 
market may be characterized as being relatively inefficient. However, credit bureaus 
are partly substituted by public credit registers that have existed in Italy since the 
1960s and in Spain since the 1980s (and do not exist in the US or in the Netherlands).  
 
 
 
3.4 Homeownership and House Price Developments 
 
With the demand for consumer debt being driven by the demand for durable and non-
durable consumption, developments in ownership rates and prices of the underlying 
assets (or durables) will play an important role. Home ownership in the Netherlands 
has been increasing steadily from about 42% in 1980, to 45% in 1990, and to about 
53% in recent years. This level is low in international comparison, but implies that the 
flow into home ownership relative to the stock is important. The US traditionally has 
a home ownership rate of about two thirds, with an upward trend over the last decade 
(from about 64% in 1990 to about 68% in 2002). Italy’s home ownership rate has also 
increased substantially, from 59% in 1980 to 68% in 1990 and to about 80% in 2002. 
Spain has had traditionally the highest homeownership rate among our countries with 
78% in 1990, rising to about 85% in 2002. 
 
Yet, these changes do not translate one for one into house price changes. Whereas the 
Netherlands, Spain and the US have seen house price booms over the last decade, 
Italy experienced declines in real house prices during most of this period, see Allen, 
Chui and Maddaloni (2004). While the Dutch house price boom decelerated in the last 
couple of years, Spanish data reveal a continuing, two-digit annual rise until recently. 
If a rise in house prices is interpreted as a permanent change to net wealth, 
homeowners may want to boost nondurable consumption by means of home equity 
withdrawal. Secondly, first-time buyers may have a higher demand for mortgages 
after house price increases (unless they are discouraged). Along with these 
developments, mortgage debt outstanding is highest in the Netherlands, whereas the 
highest growth in mortgage debt to GDP is seen in Spain (recall Table 3). These 
patterns are consistent with mortgage debt in Spain and Holland being driven by price 
increases while it is determined by changes in home ownership in Italy. In addition, 
home equity withdrawal relative to disposable income mirrored the level of house 
prices for both the Netherlands and US. In Italy and Spain, in aggregate, home equity 
withdrawal did not occur. But the excess of net lending secured on dwellings over 
investment in them became closer to zero whilst house prices declined in Italy and it 
stayed fairly constant whilst house prices rose rapidly in Spain (Allen, Chui and 
Maddaloni 2004). One possible explanation is that a greater proportion of 
homeowners in the US and Netherlands are credit or liquidity constrained than in Italy 
or Spain; another is that collateral differs in importance between the former two 
countries and Italy because of differences in judicial costs. 
 
3.5 Mortgage Market Institutions 
 
While house prices and home ownership will explain some of household debt holding, 
other characteristics of the mortgage market may be important.3 After all, the 
incidence of mortgages among Dutch households is highest despite the 
homeownership rate being lowest among all our four countries. Down payment ratios 
are typically significantly higher in Italy (42% in 1991-95) than in the Netherlands 
(25%), Spain (20%) or the US (11%) (Bianco, Jappelli and Pagano 2005). 
Conversely, the loan-to-value ratio tends to be low in Italy on average (55%), higher 
in Spain (70%) and in the US (78%) and highest in the Netherlands (90%). Maximum 
values will depend on individual lenders, but the average maximum will again be 
much larger in the Netherlands (110-115%, depending on sources) than in Italy (up to 
80%) or Spain (100%). 
 
Further, transactions cost such as legal expenses paid as a proportion of the mortgage 
house price are higher in Italy (18-20%) than in the Netherlands (11%). The OECD 
(2004) suggests that administrative costs of liquidation are also higher for Spain than 
for the US, and higher again than for the Netherlands. Also, penalties on early 
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 Bianco et al. (2005), Allen et al. (2004), Low et al. (2003) and Chiuri and Jappelli (2003) report on 
these. 
repayment of mortgage debt differ between countries. Low, Sebag-Montefiore and 
Dübel (2003) report for the Netherlands that in practice about 15% of the loan 
outstanding is prepayable without fee, whereas in Italy a fee is charged amounting to 
1 to 2% of the capital repaid. Prepayment fees in Spain are reported not to exceed 
2.5%. 
 
Of further importance for mortgage demand are the typical term of a mortgage (30 
years in the Netherlands and the US, 20 years in Spain and 15 years in Italy), and the 
period of fixed interest rates (in the US, Spain and in Italy, mortgages are typically of 
the fixed-interest type, whereas in Holland only an initial period of, say, about 10 
years is fixed-interest). Finally, some loans in the Netherlands are subject to the 
government national mortgage guarantee scheme which underwrites the loan to the 
lender so reducing the lender’s risk and consequently interest rates. 
 
3.6 Financial Systems and Financial Liberalization 
 
Throughout the 1990s there was no restriction on the regional ownership of banks in 
our European countries. In the US, prior to the Reigle-Neal Act of 1994, multistate 
bank holding companies had to apply to each State for permission to own a subsidiary 
bank in that State. The Act removed this requirement with the effect that many 
mergers between bank subsidiaries in different State occurred and new braches 
opened. Evidence by Welan (2000) indicates that this improved competition for 
deposits and we might consequently expect also an easing of constraints to borrowers. 
It may also have increased the use of risk-based loan pricing. In addition, credit 
scoring technologies are more likely to have been passed between banks in different 
States. 
 
Low, Sebag-Montefiore and Dübel (2003) characterise Italian mortgage lenders as 
having high relative costs due to lack of automation and lack of economies of scale. 
Regulations prevent branch closures. Margins are relatively high but entry by foreign 
banks is reducing them. In contrast, lenders in the Netherlands are more efficient, but 
again competition and fees paid to introducers are lowering margins. Spanish 
mortgages are characterised as being subject to increased price competition, while 
entry of foreign competitors may be limited due to providers’ cost in dealing with 
registration and repossession laws, and inefficiencies in information sharing. In 
general, forces of European integration are seen to benefit competition in all the 
European countries, however. 
 
3.7 Taxes 
 
The four countries also differ in the tax deductibility of debt interest. Both the 
Netherlands and the US used to have consumer credit interest tax-deductible, along 
with mortgage interest, while Italy never had this provision for non-mortgage debt. 
Tax reforms have changed the picture, however. The US 1986 Tax Reform Act, and 
similarly the Dutch 2001 reform of Income Tax phased out deductibility of consumer 
credit interest (see Maki (2001) for the US). Both the US and Dutch tax reforms make 
the purpose of the loan decisive for tax-deductibility: the latter applies only where the 
loan is used for investment (including maintenance) in the primary residence, and 
irrespective of loan type. Holland remains the only country with unrestricted 
deductibility of mortgage interest paid on the first primary residence. In the US, 
deductibility of “home equity debt” is further capped by a ceiling of $100,000 
outstanding per tax filer. In Italy before 1992 mortgage interest was fully tax 
deductible up to €3500. In 1992 the tax deduction was made a fixed percentage of the 
interest paid and this percentage decreased from 27% to 22% in 1997 and to 19% in 
1998. However Jappelli and Pistaferri (2004) found that these changes did not alter 
the demand for mortgages by high income tax payers relative to other groups. Main 
reforms in tax code in Spain during the 1990s relate to reductions in tax deductions 
for secondary and rented dwellings. On the other hand, imputed income from owner-
occupied housing is not subject to tax anymore. 
 
 
4. Data  
 
All four individual data sets are household surveys conducted under the auspices of 
national banks. 
 
We use a household panel dataset for each of the Netherlands and Italy and repeated 
cross sectional household data from the US. For the Netherlands we analyse the DNB 
Household Survey (DHS), which is carried out annually and contains a sample of 
nationally representative households. This data set surveys households on their 
wealth, debt, and portfolio position, income, demographics, labour force participation 
and basic work characteristics, as well as a detailed list of questions concerning the 
occupied dwelling. Consumption or expenditure is not covered. In terms of overall 
data quality, Alessie, Hochguertel and van Soest (2002) assess the DHS data as 
reliable and reasonably good, with shortcomings on representing appropriately the 
lowest and uppermost percentiles of the wealth distribution.4 The data consists of two 
strata: a representative sample and a high-income sample. The former is 
representative of the entire residential population (except for institutionalised persons 
and households); the latter is included to represent the upper decile of the income 
distribution in 1992.5  
 
For Italy we use the Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW), which has 
been carried out biennially since 1987, although its origins date back to 1965. 
Comprehensive descriptions are given by Brandolini and Cannari (1994) and Guiso 
and Jappelli (2002). The sampling is in two stages: first municipalities are chosen 
from 51 strata from throughout Italy and then households are randomly chosen from 
registry office records within each chosen municipality. The panel component makes 
up 45% of the 1995 sample, 43% of the 1993 sample and 27% of the 1991 sample. 
Departing households from the panel are replaced. There is some imputation 
especially for wealth variables, but missing values remain. Our sample consists of the 
seven waves 1991-2004, covering 5,400 households in the initial wave and around 
8,000 in the remaining ones. A larger proportion of the households surveyed were 
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 The DHS has been renamed a couple of times. Until 2002 it was called “CentER Savings Survey”. 
5
 The representative sample is available for the years 1993 through 2006 with refreshment samples 
drawn every year to replace attriting participants; the high-income sample is followed without 
replacement and essentially is non-existent from the survey wave 1998 onwards. The representative 
sample has a size of about 2,000 households each year; the high-income sample initially covered 900 
households. In terms of cross-sectional base, the DHS is the smallest of the three datasets we use, 
implying that the impact of sampling noise may be higher than in the other two surveys. 
 
discarded in 1991 than in other years because of particular difficulties in this year of 
gaining values for wealth.  
 
For the US we use the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), the most reliable source 
of information on household assets and debts, administered by the Federal Reserve 
Board. There are various sources of descriptive material on the data, the most recent 
one being Aizcorbe, Kennickell and Moore (2003). The SCF is a repeated cross 
section triennial survey of households which is intended to be nationally 
representative of the distribution on net wealth in the US. The survey has a dual frame 
sample design: a multi-stage area probability sample and an oversample of high 
wealth households. The latter sample is drawn from a sample of tax files. The former 
typically make up around 2900 households and the latter around 1400 households. It 
is not possible to identify households in the high wealth over sample. All missing 
values have been imputed five times. In this paper we use data from 1992, 95, 98 and 
2001 in our empirical modelling to be consistent with the chronological coverage for 
the Netherlands and Italy and because one of our covariates (age of children) is not 
discernable in the 2004 survey. We also use the first implicate only.  
 
The data from Spain is drawn from the first wave (2002) of the recently launched 
Bank of Spain’s Survey of Household Finances (EFF), which has been modelled after 
the SCF and also oversamples wealthy households which cannot be separately 
identified, although it does not probe household finances at quite the same depth. The 
data contains information from respondents in 5,143 households. Description and first 
quality assessment are available in Bover (2004). Similarly to the US data, the EFF 
includes multiple imputations of missing values, from which we use the first 
implicate. 
 
The earliest data we use is for the early 1990s, for the following reasons: First, the 
Dutch data is available only from 1992 onwards; second the Italian data does not 
contain sufficient questions on whether a household is credit constrained to be usable 
in 1989, third the lack of data on financial assets in the Italian data would make 
estimates of wealth derived from it very imprecise and finally the panel component of 
the SHIW was very small in 1989. Moreover, household debt holding really 
underwent the largest changes in the past 15 years.6 
 
 
Important for our paper, all surveys contain comparable information on households’ 
responses as to whether they were rejected or discouraged from applying for credit 
and whilst this is not the only possible measure of whether a household is credit 
constrained, we prefer such a measure over sample-splitting exercises along the 
financial asset distribution, as initially suggested by Zeldes (1989). We define a 
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 When referring to particular years, one remark is in order. In the tabulations to follow, a year label, 
such as “1995” can refer to different things. For instance, in the Dutch data it refers to the year when 
the interview was conducted, and hence to all measures of background characteristics and the like. 
Assets and liabilities (stocks) are measured as per 31 December of the preceding year, however, and 
incomes (flows) relate to the entire previous year. But for the SHIW and the EFF, income relates to the 
current year and the wealth variables to 31 December of that year. For the SCF income is measured for 
the previous year whereas assets and liabilities are measured as per the current year. As shall become 
apparent below, these definitional differences do not impact on the conclusions we draw from the 
empirical exercise. 
household as reporting being constrained or discouraged when at least one of the 
responding adult members reports this to be the case. 
 
A common difficulty with international comparisons of household data is that many 
variables are measured differently between the countries and sometimes even within a 
country (survey) over time. The data Appendix defines the variables we have used in 
our analysis. Education deserves special attention due to the large institutional 
variation in educational systems between countries. The Table in the Data Appendix 
lists the six education categories that we can identify in all countries and that 
correspond to OECD (1999) classifications of educational degrees. All education 
variables refer to the highest qualification for which a degree was obtained. 
 
Two further variables deserve comment. The income and age variables in the 
estimated equations are linear splines. The coefficient for each such variable 
represents the change in the dependent variable for a small change in income or age 
within that particular income or age range (see Appendix). The income spline knots 
were set to have six equally populated groups in each country in a particular year.  
Second, we included permanent income as the difference between current income and 
permanent income. The PIH argues that when this difference is positive, households 
will demand less debt believing their future income will fall and vice versa. For Italy 
and the Netherlands, where we have panel data, we estimated permanent income 
following the approach employed by Kapteyn, Alessie and Lusardi (2005). In this 
method, permanent income is found by estimating non-capital income at age a at time 
t+j, a t+j , for each age using a random effects model and then finding the annuity 
value of this assuming it is received up to age 65. For the US and Spain, where panel 
data are not available, we used the method of King and Dicks-Mireaux (1982).7 For 
purely empirical reasons (achieving a better for models fit to highly skewed data), we 
employ a log-type transformation on wealth, income and the difference between 
income and permanent income.8 
 
5. Debt Holdings  
 
We now turn to the patterns of household debt holding over time. Table 4 shows the 
incidence, mean and median household debt over all households in 1992 Euros for 
each country.9 The proportion of households with any form of debt (Table 4a) is 
around ten percentage points higher in the US than in the Netherlands and both are 
considerably higher than the percentage of Italian households with debt.  The 
incidence in Spain is midway between that of the Netherlands and Italy. Of course, 
there are slight differences in the types of debt measured in the surveys. For example, 
to present figures for a run of years we have excluded loans from relatives and friends 
from the Italian data, but this in no way alters this conclusion. These relative 
proportions for the US, the Netherlands and Italy seem to have remained constant 
over the whole of the 1990s. The difference between the proportions of households 
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 We ignore cohort effects in any of the permanent-income calculations. 
8
 The precise transformation employed is )1log( +=′ xx  if x ≥ 0 and  )1log( +−−=′ xx  if x < 0. 
It is antisymmetric and preserves zeros and signs of x. It is an alternative to the inverse hyperbolic sine 
transformation that is occasionally used in related literature. 
9
 Italy, Spain and the Netherlands introduced the Euro on January 1, 1999. We use the official 
changeover conversion rates from national currencies to Euro for Italy and the Netherlands, and for the 
US 1.1812 dollars per Euro. All amounts have subsequently been deflated to 1992 using national CPIs. 
with mortgages is even greater than for any form of debt. The percentage of US 
households having at least one mortgage is only slightly higher than the percentage of 
Dutch households. But these proportions are considerably higher than in Italy, where 
the percentage of households with a mortgage is around a quarter of that in the 
Netherlands and US, and Spain where the proportion is just over half that of the US. 
A similar pattern holds true for non-mortgage debt.  
 
TABLES 4a-c HERE 
 
If we consider trends within the US, Netherlands and Italy we can see that the 
proportion of households with any debt increased from the beginning of the decade 
until around 2000 and then seems to have decreased somewhat in Holland; in Italy the 
incidence has decreased slightly whereas the proportion of US households with any 
form of debt has remained fairly constant until around 2000 and then increased. 
However these trends in the holding of any form of debt mask differences between the 
countries when we look at specific types of debt. The proportion of households with at 
least one mortgage remained fairly constant in the Netherlands but seems to have 
decreased slightly and recently increased in Italy and it has consistently increased in 
the US. The percentage with other types of debt has decreased in the Netherlands over 
the years, whereas it remained roughly constant in the other two countries. 
 
Not only do a smaller percentage of Italian and Spanish households hold debt, but the 
average amount of debt outstanding per household is considerably lower in the two 
Mediterranean countries than in either of the other countries, as Table 4b shows. The 
average amount of debt per household in the US is ten times that in Italy, five times 
that in Spain and typically over 33% higher than that owed by Dutch households. This 
difference is mainly due to the differences in mortgage debt held and less due to 
differences in non-mortgage debt. For example, in the first half of the 1990s and early 
in the 2000s the amount of non-mortgage debt—instalment loans, credit card debt, 
educational debt and so on—in the Netherlands was around twice that held by Italian 
households. Non mortgage debt held by Spanish households was very similar to that 
in Italy. All three were around one third of the debt owed by US families. 
 
Of course, since the distribution of debt owed is very positively skewed, in Italy the 
median of total debt owed is zero. The same holds for the other countries for the less-
prevalent subcomponents. Table 4c shows the median values of debt owed by those 
who have debt. This shows a subtly different picture. In the first half of the decade the 
median debt owed, by those who have debt was actually larger in the Netherlands than 
in the US, though this ranking is reversed by 2004. The median debt in Italy was 
around a quarter of that in the Netherlands with Spanish households holding an 
amount closer to Italian households than to Dutch households. Median mortgage debt 
increased much faster in the US than in Holland, however with the growth between 
2001 and 2004 in the US being particularly large. The growth of median mortgage 
debt in Italy has also been rapid; it increased by over 110% in real terms between 
1995 and 2004, but it was always between a quarter and a third of that for Dutch 
households. Only in 2005 and 2006 do we see conditional medians surging in 
Holland. 
 
These differences are arguably caused by a combination of demand and supply 
factors. Table 5 investigates this further. This Table shows that the percentage of 
households that apply for any form of debt in Italy is considerably lower than the 
percentages in the Netherlands or Spain, which in turn are only a third of the 
percentage in the US. However, an immediate caution is necessary: the US figures 
show the proportion that applied for credit in the previous five years whereas the 
Dutch and Spanish figures relate to the previous two years and the Italian ones to the 
previous 12 months. Due to the unknown serial annual correlation at the household 
level in each country, we cannot simply divide the US figure by five and the 
Netherlands and Spain figures by two. However, within countries, we see that 
proportions stayed constant in the US in the 1990s and then increased considerably, 
whilst they have increased only moderately the Netherlands and have declined slightly 
in Italy. 
 
TABLE 5 HERE 
 
The proportion of applicants who are rejected by a lender is much higher in the US 
than in Italy, but higher in Italy than in the Netherlands and Spain. So, differences in 
debt incidence between the US and Italy or between the US and the Netherlands do 
not seem to be due to a higher reject rate in Italy or in the Netherlands. But the higher 
incidence in Spain than in Italy could be due to the lower rejection rate in Spain. 
 
We can also compare the proportion of households who are either rejected or 
discouraged from applying for a loan over the decade as shown in columns 9-12 of the 
Table. But we must note that a household who is not rejected may either have applied 
and been accepted or may not have applied. These columns merely show the 
incidence of those households who have been rejected or discouraged. This 
percentage is ten times higher in the US than in Italy. The Dutch and Spanish figures 
are at low levels but higher than the Italian ones, and for Holland increase over time. 
So, if this measure is taken as indicative of whether a household is credit constrained 
then such constraints affect a much greater percentage of the US households than of 
Italian, Spanish or Dutch households. 
 
Both the lower incidence of debt in Italy and the lower volumes of debt owed are 
consistent with the institutional differences between the countries which we noted in 
Section 3. Thus, part of the explanation for the lower debt in Italy is arguably due to 
the higher down payment requirements for house purchases (see Guiso, Jappelli and 
Terlizzese 1994). But this evidence is not consistent with the argument that the greater 
judicial costs in Italy are countered by Italian lenders only lending to lower risks than 
are accepted by lenders in the US, the Netherlands or Spain.  
 
Of course part of the explanation for the differences in the incidence of debt may be 
that it is due to inter-country differences in household attitudes to risk, time 
preference rate, retirement income replacement rate, interest rate and/or income 
shocks, as Table 2 suggests. For example, the incidence of debt holdings is predicted 
to be lower if the income growth rate is lower, the interest rate is higher, households 
are more risk averse or the income replacement rate is lower.  
 
Tables 6a and 6b compare the characteristics of the heads of households that hold debt 
with those who do not. In the Netherlands there seems to be no large difference 
between the average age of those who hold debt and those who do not, whereas in 
Italy debt holders are nine years younger than those without debt, in Spain seven years 
younger and in the US debt holders are three years younger. In terms of many other 
household characteristics there is a clear pattern which is common to all four 
countries. Those households with debt have a larger family size, more children, are 
more likely to have a paid job, less likely to be retired, more likely to be self 
employed, less likely to be single, more likely to be married, less likely to be female 
and more likely to be better educated  and on average have a higher income. 
 
TABLES 6a-b HERE 
 
As to the inter-country differences, the average age of the household head with debt in 
the Netherlands is slightly higher than in Italy, Spain and the US. The family size and 
number of children for those with debt is noticeably higher in Italy than in the 
Netherlands or the US. Among those with debt, the percentage that are self employed 
is much higher in Italy (around 23%) than the US and Spain (around 12%) and the 
Netherlands (around 5%). Clearly, the national averages of self-employment are much 
higher in Italy than in the US, Spain and the Netherlands, but the comparison reveals 
that Italian self-employed are much more likely to be debtors than their Dutch, 
Spanish and American counterparts: there are almost twice as many self-employed in 
the Italian debtor sample compared to the overall sample, but only twenty percent 
more for the cases of Holland, Spain and the US. Substantial differences also occur 
between the US, Italy and Spain on the one hand the Netherlands on the other in the 
educational contrasts between those with and those without debt. The more highly 
educated households in the US, Italy and Spain are more likely to be debt holders than 
in the other two countries; the proportion of debt holding households with a degree is 
at least ten percent above that of those without debt for the US, Italy and Spain, but no 
different for Dutch households. 
 
6. Demand for Household Debt and Credit Constraints 
 
This section sketches an empirical approach to modelling observable data structures. 
We think of observed debt holding as resulting from a multi-stage decision process 
where notional demand, to the extent that it is positive, is potentially rationed by 
supply. The columns of Table 7 correspond to this layered structure. 
 
TABLE 7 HERE 
 
To begin with, households may or may not have a demand for debt or credit. For 
example the precautionary model predicts that those that do not may be at particular 
stages of their life cycle (for instance, retirees), they may be sufficiently patient, their 
incomes may perhaps not grow enough, or, perhaps less realistically, they might face 
real possibilities of total income loss (Carroll’s income process). Such households will 
have a zero observed demand for credit. On the other hand, if one interprets desired 
demand for debt as a continuous variable it may actually be negative. 
 
Those that want a positive amount of debt or credit may actually not apply for a loan 
because they are discouraged by the prospect of possible rejection. Whether or not 
such households have the right point expectations as regards their probability of being 
rejected is immaterial for our purposes; as a matter of fact, such households do exist. 
 
Conditional of not being discouraged, applicants with a positive demand for credit 
would apply for a certain loan. Those that are discouraged (and whose demand is 
positive by definition) will not apply for that same loan. (Of course, there may be 
people that are discouraged for one type of loan and not for some other). In other 
words, given a loan that a household with a positive demand can apply for, these two 
decisions are the same.  
 
Those that apply may be rejected by the lender. The application may be entirely 
turned down, or it may be partly rejected in the sense that only part of the loan amount 
applied for is granted.  
 
Summarizing, there are various ways to generate zero observed debt holding. 
Households with positive observed credit will need to want it, not be discouraged but 
rather make an application, and not be rejected by the lender10. 
 
To focus ideas, an empirical model may encompass the following equations  
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where did denotes the demand for debt by household i, and x1i is a vector of variables 
that explain demand by household i. The iα  are household-specific, time-invariant 
effects and capture factors like household-specific interest rates, marginal tax rates, 
preferences, lender’s risk assessment of the applicant (rather than the application), and 
so on. Of course if we estimated the parameters of equation (6.1) using only those 
households of row 1 in the table and the error terms in the four equations were 
correlated, then sample selection biased would result. 
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 In all four data sets we observe the details on whether or not a household holds any debt (including 
the structure of debt portfolios), the amounts of debt outstanding, whether or not a household has 
applied for credit in the recent past, whether or not applications were turned down, and whether or not 
households refrained from applying in anticipation of rejection. However, both theoretical reasoning 
and the empirical structure sketched above are cast in terms of a particular credit contract with a given 
interest rate about which a decision is made at a particular point in time. Data questionnaires are 
typically not as precise and do not meet this conditioning. For the US and Netherlands a household may 
therefore be observed to be discouraged and yet apply, be rejected, and yet obtain a loan of desired 
size—possibly at a different interest rate or from a different lender or at a slightly different point in 
time. 
 
In addition, credit applications may be understood as referring to a flow concept (addition to debt) 
rather than the stock of debt that we observe in the data. If we measured the flow by the change of the 
stock over time, our framework would still apply. Flows can, however, also be negative when 
repayments on the debt outstanding are made. In the Table, the difference between the last two lines is 
that the penultimate row only applies to the demand for a stock of debt whereas the last line relates to 
the demand for a flow of net credit extended. Other rows may equally apply to flow or stock concepts. 
In the case where the household wishes negative debt, only zero debt is observed. 
 
There are several possible ways to see the model and interpret what we observe in the 
data. For instance, if the model’s equations are (6.1), (6.2) and (6.4) we might observe 
dd only if households hold positive debt and are unconstrained. The last equation 
allows, in principle, people to be rejected that have not applied, since the application 
decision is not separately modeled. 
 
If the equations are (6.1) and (6.4) and the demand equation is modelled as a tobit 
(i.e., equation (6.2) is not separately specified), we assume the same process to 
determine the unconstrained zeros as the positive observations. 
 
There are various other possibilities of tailoring the model to the data. In each case, 
interpretation of the parameter estimates will change. For instance, Duca and 
Rosenthal (1993), Cox and Jappelli (1993) and Crook (2001) estimate equations (6.1), 
(6.2) and (6.4) using cross sectional data only. Notice that whether a household 
desires positive debt or not will generally be correlated with whether the household 
applies or not since one might assume that many of those who desire debt will apply, 
unless transactions costs make application undesirable or a household believed it 
would be turned down.  
 
7. Empirical Results 
 
7.1 Estimators and their Implementation 
 
The various models presented in the previous section may in principle be estimated on 
the available data. If we make distributional assumptions on both idiosyncratic errors 
and random effects, we can estimate the models by maximum likelihood (ML).11 
However the derived ML estimators yielded implausible parameter estimates for Italy 
and the Netherlands, possibly indicating that one of the selection channels plays a 
minor role. This is consistent with the relatively few rejected or discouraged cases. In 
order to present estimates that can be meaningfully compared across countries, we 
therefore confine ourselves to single equation models. Here, we assume the 
household’s utility from making an application depends on exogenous variables 
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 This estimator has preferred asymptotic properties including efficiency, conditional on being 
correctly specified. The most convenient distributional assumption to make is that of multivariate 
normality, because this economises on the number of distributional parameters to be estimated while 
being entirely flexible as regards between-equation correlations. In addition, all marginals and 
conditional probabilities will be normal as well which is convenient for computational purposes. 
 
For implementation, we chose to rely on gradient-based algorithms that require first analytical 
derivatives. Solving the problem proceeds iteratively. Starting values can be obtained from simplified 
models that obtain under parameter restrictions from the more general ones sketched above. Since the 
likelihood function requires multivariate integration, we considered maximizing a simulated likelihood 
function where the integral is replaced by a sum over simulated probabilities that obtain when the 
random effects are drawn from the distribution whose parameters we estimate along with the 
coefficients on the regressors. 
 
During iterations it appeared that estimating these fairly general models with unrestricted between-
equation correlation structure of the composite errors is asking too much from both the Dutch and the 
Italian samples. Especially with the Italian data we found that between-equation correlations and 
variances would run off to the boundaries of the parameter space and eventually prevent the algorithm 
from finding a solution. In the Dutch case, we were able only to estimate a subset of the correlations, 
which however were not significantly different from zero. 
which the literature has suggested affect the desired volume of debt from the PIH. 
These variables are log current income, log difference between current and permanent 
income, age, and log net worth, and also taste shifters which may affect the 
parameters of a household’s utility function: number of children of different ages, 
marital status, level of education, occupational status and gender. We have used the 
same variables for all four countries where possible. In addition, we control for time 
and regional effects without reporting them. 
 
In addition, for the United States sample, as it is a repeated cross section, consistent 
two-step estimators for at least some of the selection models considered do exist. In 
this case we assume the model to consist of equations (6.1), (6.2) and (6.4) (excluding 
the random effects): 
(7.3)                                    equation  selection  constraintcredit                 
(7.2)                                         equation  selection debt  positive                  
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We pooled those who were discouraged from applying together with those who were 
rejected since in this case also observed debt deviates from desired debt. So we have 
rows 1, 2 (combined with 3) and 4 in Table 7 with demand uniquely observed only for 
row 1. Notice that the errors of equations (7.2) and (7.3) may also be correlated. We 
followed the methodology of Tunali (1986) to estimate the parameters of this model 
(full details in Appendix 2) by OLS from the following second-stage equation: 
 
errorxd
iiiiiiiii
d
i +++′= 3311 εεεεεεεε λσλσβ                          (7.4) 
 
where 
ii 1εε
λ  and 
ii 3εε
λ are the analogues of inverse Mill’s ratios which are estimated 
from a first-stage bivariate probit with selection consisting of equations (7.2) and 
(7.3). Consistent standard errors for equation (7.4) were obtained by bootstrapping the 
estimates 1000 times. Since we are using the selection equations merely to remove 
sample selection bias in the parameters in equation (7.1), and since more variables are 
available for the US than for other countries, we can rely on a larger set of exclusion 
restrictions than would appear from the single-equation estimates that we present for 
the other countries. 
 
7.2 Credit Applications 
 
Table 8 shows the results for application decisions. Within the 1990s information on 
whether a household made an application is available only from 1995 onwards in both 
the US and Italy. Notice that the random effect for both the Netherlands and Italy 
contributes a statistically significant amount of variance to the overall variance. In all 
countries, greater net worth reduces the probability that a household will apply for any 
form of debt. However the marginal effect for Spain is three times that for the 
Netherlands which in turn is roughly double that for Italy and the US . The income 
patterns in all countries are difficult to characterize precisely, as we find the estimated 
spline function to change gradient, and sometimes direction in nonuniform ways. The 
overall impression is, however, that current income increases the probability of 
applying for loans in the European countries, whereas we see significantly negative 
impacts of income for the upper part of the income distribution in America.  
 
TABLE 8 HERE 
 
We control for the level of permanent income in these specifications by way of 
including the difference between current and permanent income. The reason for doing 
so is that demand for credit according to the PIH would be affected by changes in 
permanent income, once levels of incomes, wealth, and demographics are accounted 
for. There appears to be no effect for Italy, Spain or the United States. For the 
Netherlands, however, having current income exceed permanent income will decrease 
the probability of applying for new loans. On the background of the simple PIH story 
told above, this may be consistent with Dutch households interpreting a positive 
deviation from permanent income as a temporary income shock as its effect on 
consumption will be limited.  
 
Age of the household head displays pronounced patterns in all four countries. To the 
extent that the marginal effect estimates are significant we observe a decreasing 
probability of applying with age. The age gradient increases (in absolute value) for 
both the US and Italy: as household heads become older they are increasingly less 
likely to apply for a loan. This result conforms with the intuition provided by the 
standard consumption models. We should add, though, that we have not controlled for 
cohort effects, which may lead the age coefficients to deviate from true life cycle 
profiles.  
 
Neither in Italy, Spain nor in the Netherlands is there an effect of educational 
attainment on the probability of applying for credit. This is different in the US, where 
there is a greater probability that those who have a university degree or have gained 
vocational training will apply than the chance that those with merely primary or 
secondary school education. If education proxies income growth, we might expect 
such a pattern (although we do not control for time preference). 
 
Family composition may matter because the presence and number of children, as well 
as their age may affect the marginal utility of consumption over the life cycle in 
predictable ways. We see that their importance differs across countries. Number of 
children at different ages tends to be important in Italy. Such effects are not observed 
for the other three countries. Part of this difference for the oldest age group, may be 
due to a slight difference in the question asked. In the US and the Netherlands the 
questionnaire asks whether the respondent or spouse applied whereas in Italy the 
questionnaire asks whether ‘the household’ applied and in Spain the subject could be 
either.12 So in Italy and possibly Spain the effect of older children applying for loans 
to finance their personal consumption may be counted towards a household credit 
application. A further significant difference is found for single person households who 
are less likely to apply than couples in any of the countries (not significant in Italy). 
  
Clear differences are apparent in the effects of occupational status on the probability 
of applying. Compared with having a paid job, being unemployed reduces the 
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 The relevant question asks “How many loan applications have you made in the last two years 
(including applications to refinance previous loans)?” (p23) where “you” could be singular or plural. 
probability of application in the Netherlands and US, with a much larger marginal 
effect in the US than in the Netherlands. Unemployment has no effect in Italy but 
increases the chance of an application in Spain. For the US, having an occupation 
which does not give an income, being retired, or being disabled reduces the 
probability that a household will apply, compared to those with a paid job. In the 
European countries no other types of occupation have an effect on the probability of 
application. 
 
Further, region and time effects are included but not reported in the table. In Italy 
there was a greater chance a household would apply in 1998 than in 1995, and a lower 
chance in 2002. In the US no differences between the years in the 1990s were 
detected. Finally the probability a household from the South or from the North East of 
Italy will apply is lower than the chance a household from the Central region will 
apply. With evidence from Fabbri and Padula (2004) that judicial costs are higher in 
the South of Italy than in the northern regions the lower application probability in the 
South may be due to banks requiring a higher deposit or charging a higher interest rate 
than institutions elsewhere in Italy. Obviously this would not explain the lower 
application rate in the North East. Regional effects are also detected in the 
Netherlands, although they do not lend themselves easily to interpretation. We cannot 
control for regional effects in the SCF or for Spain. 
  
7.3 Credit Constraints 
 
To investigate whether the characteristics of credit constrained households differ 
between countries and over time we again estimated random effects probits for the 
Netherlands and for Italy, a probit for Spain and pooled probits for the US. We used 
the same explanatory variables as before. Since all of these variables would also enter 
a credit scoring equation (Crook, Thomas and Hamilton 1992) the estimated 
parameters cannot be interpreted as those of a demand or of a supply equation, but 
merely as the difference in parameters between that in each of a demand and a supply 
equation.  
 
We estimate three separate equations. In the first we model the probability that a 
household is rejected or gains only a part of their application, conditional on having 
applied. We have done this for all countries except Spain because the very small 
number of constrained households frustrated our attempts to gain plausible results. 
Second we consider all households and distinguish between (a) those who applied and 
were rejected or gained only part of the amount they applied for or those that did not 
apply and were discouraged from applying because they thought they would be turned 
down and (b) all others. Thirdly we consider all households and distinguish between 
(a) those who report that they have been rejected or unable to gain the entire amount 
they applied for or who report that they were discouraged from applying and (b) all 
others. Because of the questionnaire design the second and third definitions identify 
the same households as being constrained in Spain and also in Italy13 and so results 
for the third definition relate only to the Netherlands and US. 
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 In the Spanish EFF a household can be identified as discouraged only if it did not apply. The same 
applies in the Italian SHIW (after 1993). 
The first equation mirrors a stringent definition of being credit constrained in the 
sense that one can only be constrained if one actually applies for credit and is rejected. 
The second definition is somewhat laxer since it includes as constrained those who 
did not actually apply but who wished to have credit nevertheless and did not receive 
it. Such households may or may not have had an accurate expectation as to the 
reaction of a lender. But the point is that they did not gain all of the credit they wished 
to obtain. The third definition is consistent with the definition adopted by Cox and 
Jappelli (1993), Jappelli (1990), Crook (1996) and Crook (2001).  
 
We argue that both definition 1 and 2 are a more reasonable interpretation of being 
credit constrained than certain others. For example, Duca and Rosenthal (1993) 
estimate the probability of being credit constrained using the above second definition 
applied only to a sample of debtors. But if a household’s applications were all rejected 
this household would not appear in their sample of households who are credit 
constrained. 
 
Tables 9 a, b and c show the estimated marginal effects at the means for the three 
definitions respectively.14 For the Italian data the random effect makes no contribution 
to the residual error of each equation and the same parameter values for each equation 
would result if the observations were all pooled over time.  
 
Turning to the results for the first definition (Table 9a) we see that there is a lower 
probability that wealthier Dutch or American households would be rejected than 
lower-wealth households, but this was not found for Italian households.  A negative 
effect is entirely expected: wealthier households have more collateral and may 
demand less debt, but the marginal effect is much greater for US households than for 
Dutch households. 
  
TABLES 9a-c HERE 
 
The effect of income also differs between the countries. In the Netherlands and Italy it 
has no separate effect whilst for American families the chance of rejection decreases 
for the third, fourth, and fifth quintile groups.  This general effect is consistent with 
credit scoring models that find that increased income reduces the risk of default. 
 
Perhaps one of the most important results is that the greater the amount by which 
income exceeds permanent income the greater the chance a household is credit 
constrained. This was found for  three countries (although the Dutch coefficient is not 
significantly different from zero). This could be because the greater is income relative 
to permanent income the increase in a households demand for debt exceeds the 
increase in amount lenders are willing to supply. But we know from Table 8 that 
(except for the Netherlands) an increase in ‘excess income’ has no effect on the 
chance a household makes a credit application, so perhaps the effect is on the volume 
demanded by those who do apply. It seems highly unlikely that an increase in ‘excess 
income’ would increase the risk a lender may associate with an applicant, though it is 
possible when lenders believe that ‘excess income’ is indicative that future income 
will be lower than current income (mean reversion). However, there is no reported 
evidence in the literature that lenders behave in this way and much informal evidence 
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 Estimated coefficients and standard errors are available from the authors on request. 
that they do not. But if ‘excess income’ increases the demand for the volume of debt, 
this does not seem to be consistent with the PIH. Of course there are many 
interpretations of the term “permanent income” and our last statement can only be 
made for the interpretation implicit in the measure of permanent income that we have 
used. Our result would seem to be consistent with the “excess sensitivity” findings 
common in studies that use aggregate data. 
 
The effect of age appears to differ between the three countries. In both the 
Netherlands and Italy, age of the household head does not appear to affect rejection 
significantly (pre-retirement Dutch households being the exception). In the US, 
increased age within one’s 30s and over 65 years reduces the chance of being turned 
down.  It is not immediately obvious why these differences between countries occur. 
On the supply side, credit scoring models for westernised countries generally find that 
age is negatively related to the chance of default (Crook, Thomas and Hamilton 
1992). Indeed the Equal Credit opportunities Act 1974 in the US requires lenders to 
constrain risk assessment models which include age such that applicants over 62 years 
are regarded as of lower risk than younger applicants. So perhaps the age after which 
default risk falls differs between the countries. Perhaps this effect begins in the early 
30s in the US, whereas in Italy, where credit scoring models were introduced later 
than in the Netherlands or the US, age may not formally enter credit risk assessment 
procedures.  On the demand side all combinations of parameters of the precautionary 
model predicted that the percentage of constrained households would decrease as age 
increases (Table 2). However other models of constraints might usefully be included 
in the model. 
  
Education is only significant for the US again, where the estimation samples are also 
larger. Having completed high school or having gained a vocational qualification 
increases the chance of being rejected.  The effects of the number of children differ 
between the countries. American and Italian households with more kids in the 7-12 
years or 13-19 years age groups face a higher chance of being turned down and this 
extends to American families with kids ages 7-19 years but not to Italian households, 
and age of kids has no effect on the chance that a Dutch household would be turned 
down. 
 
Turning to occupational status we again see some interesting differences. In the 
Netherlands, not having a job which provides income increases a household’s chance 
of being turned down whereas in the US it actually reduces this probability and in 
Italy it has no effect. Disability appears to incur rejection in both US and Holland. In 
the US but not Italy or the Netherlands, being retired reduces the chance of being 
rejected. In the US but in neither European country being female reduces the chance 
of being constrained whereas in Italy, unlike the Netherlands or US, being single is 
disadvantageous. In the US single parents seem to have a higher chance of being 
turned down, but this was not found in the Netherlands or Italy. 
 
Finally, regional differences (not reported in the Table) become apparent in the 
Netherlands but not in Italy. The absence of an effect for Italy means we should be 
cautious in concluding that higher judicial and enforcement costs in the South of Italy 
cause lenders to reject a higher proportion of credit applicants. 
 
When we include those families that were discouraged and did not apply into our 
definition of being credit constrained we gain essentially similar results (Table 9b), 
although the sample sizes increase substantially and we are able to compare with 
Spain. The differences in results compared with those in Table 9a for the US, 
Netherlands and Italy are as follows. When discouraged families are included, wealth 
becomes significantly negative for Italy, suggesting that the less wealthy are 
discouraged from making credit applications. This is also our conclusion for Spain 
and so for all four countries.  Income is no longer significant for Italy and is not 
significant for Spain. The effect of a greater ‘excess income’ is positive and highly 
significant for Italy, the US and the Netherlands, but has no effect in Spain.  
 
Including the discouraged would also alter our conclusions about the effect of age and 
education. The effect of age reducing the chance of being constrained is much more 
apparent with the effect occurring during one’s 30s amongst Dutch and US 
households and in one’s 40s amongst Italian families. Households with heads over 50 
years in the US and over 65 years in Italy face further reduced chances of being 
constrained. Turning to education, the somewhat more highly educated (education 
class 6) are less likely to be discouraged (or rejected) in the Netherlands, and in Spain 
this is generally true for those that completed their education after primary level.  For 
American families including the discouraged leads to the increased chance of being 
constrained to extend to those that completed their education after just primary level, 
a clear contrast with the effect for Spain. Again to interpret this result we need to 
know the effect of education on the volume of debt demanded. 
 
Including the discouraged would also alter our conclusions on the effect of the 
number of children. The US and Dutch results remain the same. In Spain like in the 
Netherlands number of kids has no effect. But now on average an Italian family with 
more children in the age range 7 to 12 years or above 20 would face a greater chance 
of being constrained, just as in the US. As before, a difference in terms of 
questionnaire may contribute to the difference, especially for older children: Italian 
children tend to live with their parents until their thirties while trying to find 
independent housing and applying for mortgages. Asking if a member of the 
household had been discouraged from applying combined with the higher deposits 
required by mortgage grantors in Italy than elsewhere may disproportionately pick out 
families of those type of young would-be home owners. 
 
Adopting the second definition of being credit constrained does not alter our findings 
on the effects of different occupations with the exception that a Dutch household is 
more likely to be credit constrained if its head is self-employed compared to being an 
employee. Italian and Spanish households are more likely to be constrained if the 
head is unemployed. Clearly being unemployed discourages Italian households from 
applying. 
 
Regional differences do become important in Italy when the discouraged are included 
and they remain significant in the Netherlands. In Italy, we find that the average 
family living in the North West or South or the Islands has a lower chance of being 
constrained than one living in the Central region. This result appears to contradict the 
findings of Fabbri and Padula (2004) that higher judicial costs in the South increase 
the chance of being constrained.  
 
If we compare our results with the literature, the paper with the closest definition to 
our second definition is the one by Duca and Rosenthal (1993) using the 1983 SCF. 
They find none of the variables we have included to be significant. But their sample 
differs considerably from ours (apart from the time period). We include all households 
whereas they include only households where the head is aged under 35 years, with 
wealth no more than $1m and who are not in the high income over sample. Moreover 
they estimate their model over households that have positive debt whereas we 
estimate our results from households who applied in the previous five years. Magri 
(2002) considered the 1989, 1995 and 1998 waves of the SHIW and found increased 
income and being self-employed increased the chance of being constrained whilst 
being married reduced the chance. 
 
Our third definition of being constrained (Table 9c) identifies those households that 
were rejected or discouraged (regardless of whether they applied or not). Remember 
that households that did not say they fitted into either of these categories may have not 
wished to have any debt, whereas those who did reply affirmatively certainly did wish 
to have credit. Since we are not making the definition conditional on having applied 
or not applied for credit we can include an additional year (1992) in the US sample. 
Our findings here are very similar to those for the last definition (Table 9b), and we 
highlight some of the differences.  
 
For the Dutch sample, we see now a significantly lower probability of being 
constrained when income increases for just below median households. Also, there are 
now stronger and significant negative impacts of age for both Holland and the US, 
with households in their 40s in the US now being more likely to be constrained. But 
the marginal effects remain considerably lower in the Netherlands than in the US.  
 
In terms of labour market, self-employed are more likely to be constrained in both 
countries. American unemployed heads are less likely to be constrained, but 
unemployment has no effect in Holland. To interpret this, observe that in the SCF a 
household can be both discouraged and yet apply. For instance, it might apply to a 
place other than the place where it thought it would be turned down. So it possible 
that unemployed in the US were less discouraged than those in paid jobs because they 
were more likely to think of applying to sub-prime lenders of various types.  
 
Other demographics do change in terms of impact for the US, where we now find a 
significant negative impact of being female and a positive one of being divorced or 
widowed.  
 
Once again, recall that in this definition we populate the sample with potentially those 
that have no demand for credit, which perhaps mixes effects from the various 
equations that we delineated in the earlier section. The definition has been employed 
elsewhere, however, and we may shortly contrast these findings with ours. Cox and 
Jappelli (1993) use the 1983 SCF and Crook (2001) the 1995 SCF. The same results 
were obtained for wealth, family size, gender, and age.  
 
7.4 Household Debt: Amounts 
 
Since a household is credit constrained when its demand for debt exceeds its supply 
we cannot fully interpret the equations in the last section without having an 
understanding of intercountry differences in the determinants of the demand for debt. 
This is the aim of this section. As explained before, selection bias may not be much of 
an issue for the Netherlands and Italy, and we can explicitly check for the US. So we 
concentrate on regressing the (log of) the level of total debt held on regressors, 
conditional on holding positive debt for the Netherlands and Italy and on a sample 
selection corrected equation for the US where the selection of a sample with positive 
debt does appear to induce bias. We use a Tobit for Spain where a positive debt 
sample otherwise gives implausible parameters. In all cases we are interested in the 
marginal effects in the whole population, not merely those with positive debt. 
 
Table 10 gives the results. Indeed, across the board signs and significance levels of 
coefficient estimates differ substantially from those in exercises conducted with the 
other equations, suggesting that different processes for application, rejection, and debt 
holding are at work. 
 
TABLE 10 HERE 
 
The effect of wealth on demand is strongly negative in the Netherlands and Italy with 
the marginal effects being similar. In the US the sample selection equation indicates 
that wealth has no effect. The same is true of Spain. This is consistent with the 
ranking of countries we would expect if bankruptcy protection impacted on the 
demand by high asset households, as studies for the United States suggest they do 
(Gropp, Scholz and White 1997).  
 
Increased income in the second ntile group increases demand in all four countries but 
after that the effect differs noticeably between the countries. In the United States 
demand increases as household income increases within each income ntile. But in 
Italy increased income has no effect on demand unless the family is in the highest 
ntile group.  Dutch households’ demand shows plateau effects with income. As 
income increases within the second and third ntile groups demand increases, it then 
stays at that level throughout the fourth group, increases within the fifth group but 
does not increase thereafter. In addition the marginal effects for households in the 
United States, Holland and Spain are generally  larger than the marginal effects for 
Italian families. 
 
An interesting finding is that the greater the amount by which income is below 
permanent income the greater the amount of debt demanded in both the Netherlands 
and United States, but demand does not change in Italy or Spain. For the Netherlands 
and the United States this is consistent with the CE version of the PIH, though we 
have considered debt in aggregate rather than mortgage and consumer debt separately. 
Combining this result with our earlier results we now have a good picture of the 
households’ decisions in four countries. Italy Spain and the United States are similar 
and differ from the Netherlands. In Italy and Spain, there is no effect on the chance 
that a household will apply for credit the lower is income below permanent income 
and there would be no effect either on the amount demanded by those who do apply. 
But in Holland the lower is income below permanent income the more likely a 
household will apply, the greater the amount the household will ask for.  Interestingly 
this has no effect on the chance of being constrained. For American households a 
reduction in income below permanent income will not affect the chance it will apply 
for a loan but it will increase the amount demanded. It will also reduce the chance it is 
constrained. This is a puzzle that at present we are unable to resolve. One might 
expect that a household with an income much below permanent income would have a 
lower chance of being offered debt rather than a higher chance compared to a family 
with higher income relative to permanent income. Indeed credit scoring models 
typically include income as a predictive variable though its contribution is usually 
relatively small..  
 
The effect of age on demand is consistent with the CE version of the PIH for the 
Netherlands, Spain and the United States, but slightly less so for Italy. In the 
Netherlands demand increases until age 40, and 30ish in the United States. In Spain 
demand decreases progressively as the head of the household becomes older than 30 
years, in the Netherlands demand  decreases progressively as the head of household 
becomes older than 50 years whilst in the United States the decrease in demand only 
starts from age 65. Surprisingly, in Italy demand decreases as the head ages between 
40 and 65 years whereafter it stays constant. 
 
These findings are also consistent with the precautionary consumption model (Table 
2) for the Netherlands and the United States. The benchmark case shows mean debt 
divided by income ratios, both conditional and unconditional, increasing to age 40 and 
declining thereafter. The ratio plummets after age 50 but patterns which are more 
consistent with the data for the Netherlands and the United States can be seen if the 
income shocks are reduced or the time preference rate increased above the benchmark 
figures. The observed constant demand after age 65 for Italy is not predicted by the 
precautionary model unless the parameters are set to result in no debt being held. The 
decreased demand after age 30 is predicted if retirement income as a proportion of 
pre-retirement income is lowered to 65%, or if income growth is considerably 
increased. 
 
The effect of education also differs between the three countries. Having earned a high 
school diploma or university degree rather than merely leaving after elementary 
school increases demand in Italy. In the United States having completed high school 
actual reduces demand whilst other educational levels completed have no different 
effect compared with elementary school. In the Netherlands having had a vocational 
training or a university degree increases demand relative to merely leaving after 
primary school. In Spain education has no effect. More young children under the age 
of 6 years increase the amount of debt demanded in the Netherlands, Spain and the 
United States but do not alter demand in Italy. Having more pre-teenage kids 
increases demand in Spain and the United States, but not elsewhere. Interestingly, 
having more teenage kids in the family in the United States increases demand, but 
does not do so in the other countries. 
 
Being unemployed appears to have no effect on the desired stock of debt, except for 
the Netherlands. If debt is providing insurance against unexpected income shocks one 
would expect those who are unemployed to desire more debt to smooth consumption. 
But if a household expects a spell of unemployment to be long-term it would not 
desire more debt. Our result is consistent with the latter hypothesis but does not seem 
to be consistent with the former. Of course the effect may be on the flow of credit 
rather than the stock of debt. 
 
Various other employment states also have no effect on demand: having an 
occupation which yields no income (no paid job), being retired (except in Spain), 
having another job or being disabled. In Italy, Holland and the United States the self 
employed demand considerably more debt than others, but not in Spain. The absence 
of an effect in Spain is surprising because it has the highest employment protection. 
The greater effect of being self employed in Italy than in the United States is slightly 
puzzling because bankruptcy protection appears greater in the US than in Italy. But it 
may reflect differences in the structure of the debt markets between the countries with 
small business loans being less available from financial institutions in Italy than in the 
United States.15  
 
Female heads of households demand less debt in the Netherlands and in the United 
States though for the United States the effect is only detectable for the population as a 
whole and not for those who have debt. Gender has no effect in Italy or Spain. Single 
people demand less debt in the Netherlands, Italy and Spain which is unsurprising, but 
not in the United States, although those who are divorced or widowed demand less 
only in the Netherlands and Spain. Single parents demand less in the Netherlands but 
not in Italy, Spain or the United States. This may reflect the greater provision of 
welfare funding in the Netherlands than in the other two countries.  
 
Finally, some comments on the selection model discussed at the end of section 6 are 
in order. The debt holding equation (7.1) is corrected for bivariate selectivity from 
those that are unconstrained conditional on having positive debt. In this definition, we 
include the discouraged ones with the constrained ones and estimate the selection 
process on the full sample. We identify the effect nonparametrically by imposing 
exclusion restrictions. We include in the constrained equation, but exclude from the 
positive debt equation, whether the household had been two or more months behind 
with credit payments in the last six months (Default), whether the head or spouse was 
currently social security benefit payments (Welfare), number of years the head has 
worked for the same employer (Years at job) and number of financial institutions the 
family has accounts or loans with (No of accounts). These variables are the type that 
appear in credit scoring models and are less likely to affect whether a household 
desires debt than whether the household is likely to be rejected by a lender. Equation 
7.3 was identified by including attitudes towards the use of credit for the purchase of 
certain items (fur coats, cars, vacations, education and living expenses when income is 
cut), which would not be observed by financial institutions in the positive debt 
equation, but excluding them from the constrained equation. The demand for debt 
equation (7.1) is then identified by the combined exclusion restrictions (and, 
differences in functional form in the age and income regressors). The estimated 
parameters of the selection equations for the US are given in Appendix 3. This shows 
that most of the identifying variables are significant, in some cases very highly so, 
with the expected sign. 
 
We find evidence of selection bias for the US if we had only sampled those with debt. 
Formally, the selection correction term for having positive debt is significant, but 
notice that the one for not being constrained is not significant (this conclusion is based 
on bootstrapped standard errors). Quantitatively, in almost all cases except for wealth, 
                                               
15
 Remember that the stock of debt for Italy excludes debt supplied by relatives and friends, unlike the 
US and NL data. 
we observe only minor differences between coefficient estimates between the 
selection-corrected estimates and the pooled-OLS  case (final column in Table 10). 
 
8. Conclusions 
 
In this paper we have investigated the prevalence of household debt holding and the 
incidence of being credit constrained using comparable micro data from four OECD 
countries: the United States, the Netherlands, Italy and Spain. We measure credit 
constraints from self-reports on having been turned down for a credit application, but 
can also take into account discouraged would-be applicants. 
 
We document stark differences across these countries in terms of debt incidence, debt 
levels, and the proportion of rationed households (whose demand is not met at the 
given interest rate). We generate quantitative predictions from a simulated life cycle 
precautionary savings model to understand how parameters of a consumer’s problem 
influence demand for credit and severity of binding constraints. Whilst many of these 
parameters are not directly observable, we can ascribe differences in credit market 
behaviour to differences in household characteristics. 
 
In summary, we find that a much greater proportion of US households apply for credit 
than for the Netherlands or Spain with Italy far behind. This is due to a combination 
of factors. Whilst Americans have much higher wealth than households in Italy, Spain 
or the Netherlands, this only acts to reduce the chance of application and so is 
outweighed by the effect of higher American incomes. Income further below 
permanent income increases the chance of application amongst Dutch families which 
is consistent with the certainty equivalence version of the permanent income 
hypothesis. However, contrary to the hypothesis, income has no effect amongst US, 
Spanish or Italian families. The average age of US heads of households is comparable 
to that in Italy, Spain and the Netherlands but the marginal effects of age, especially 
above 50 years, acts to reduce the chance a family applies. Being unemployed reduces 
the chance of application, in the US and in Holland, suggesting unemployment is 
either not expected to be temporary there or that credit is not being used to smooth 
consumption. Single household heads also have a lower chance of applying. 
 
Of those households who do apply a much higher proportion are rejected in the US 
than in either the Netherlands or Italy and especially Spain. Including those 
households that are discouraged from applying suggests that a considerably smaller 
percentage of Italian, Spanish and Dutch households are credit constrained than of 
American families. In fact, the proportion of Dutch, Spanish and Italian households 
who actually declare themselves to be constrained is tiny in comparison with the 
percentage for the US. Again, wealth acts to reduce the chance of being constrained in 
all four countries with a relatively large marginal effect in the US. Age reduces the 
chance of being constrained with each year having a greater effect on the chance of 
being constrained in the US than in Italy or the Netherlands. But age has no effect in 
Spain. Being retired reduces the chance a household is constrained in the US, whereas 
in both the US and Netherlands having a disability increases the chance. Being 
unemployed increases the chance of being turned down or discouraged from applying 
in Italy and the United States. 
 
Finally, average debt holdings are ten times higher in the US than in Italy, five times 
higher than in Spain with the Netherlands around three quarters that of the US.  More 
wealthy households demand less debt in Italy and the Netherlands, but wealth has no 
effect in Spain or in the US, apart from within the group that possesses debt. We are 
unable to explain why income further below permanent income increases the demand 
for debt but reduces the chance that a household is constrained. Demand follows the 
CE and precautionary savings versions of the PIH with respect to age and whilst the 
effect of total income is monotonically positive in the US there are plateau effects in 
Italy, Spain and the Netherlands. Having teenage kids increases demand in the US, 
but surprisingly has no effect in Italy, Spain or the Netherlands. Apart from the self-
employed demanding more debt in the US and Italy, labour market variables have no 
discernable effect. 
 
Many of the unexplained observed inter-country differences are however likely due to 
institutional differences between the four countries. Employment protection is greater 
in Italy, Spain and the Netherlands than in the US, and income uncertainty is highest 
in the US than in the Netherlands or Italy. So we would expect less willingness to 
borrow, because of greater repayment uncertainty, in the US than in Italy, Spain and 
the Netherlands. In the US there is more protection in the event of bankruptcy than in 
the Netherlands or Italy suggesting greater supply and also greater demand by 
wealthier households in the former than in the latter countries. Collateral liquidation 
costs are much higher in Italy than in the other countries and there is a lower degree of 
information sharing via credit bureaus in Italy, suggesting greater information 
asymmetry between lenders and borrowers.  Homeownership rates are highest in 
Spain and Italy followed by the US and finally the Netherlands with house prices 
increasing rapidly in the Netherlands, Spain and the US, but less rapidly in Italy. 
Mortgage demand should therefore be greater in Italy, Spain and the Netherlands than 
in the US. On the other hand, down payment ratios are higher in Italy than in the 
Netherlands, Spain and the US so reducing mortgage demand in Italy, and this is 
exasperated by the higher prepayment penalties in Italy than in the Netherlands and 
the US. Mortgage payments are fully tax deductible in the Netherlands, but only up to 
a limit in the US and especially in Italy, reducing net interest rates in the Netherlands 
compared with the US and Italy respectively. 
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Data Appendix 
 
Age (for all countries) 
 
The interpretation of the coefficients in each equation of the form 
iiq
q
kikii agexy εββ ++′= ∑  where q denotes spline q, is:  
   
  β1 if age< 30 
dy  β2 if  30 ≤ age< 40 
___   =    β3  if  40 ≤ age< 50 
dage  β4  if  50 ≤ age< 650 
  β5   if  65 ≤ age 
   
 
Education 
 
Education variables standardised on OECD (1999). The classification refers to 
educational stages completed, rather than merely being undertaken. 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Variable Description      ISCED97 
Classification 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Edu1  Other, not specified, don’t know, refused 
Edu2  None or primary     0, 1 
Edu3  Lower secondary and equivalent   2 A, B, C 
Edu4  Upper secondary (high school etc)   3 A, B, C 
Edu5  Vocational etc above upper secondary  4 A, B, C 
Edu6  College, Polytechnic, University and above  5 A, B, 6 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2 
Details of the Parameter Estimation for the Demand Function for the US 
 
The method for estimation is a two stage procedure originally proposed by Heckman 
(1976) and follows Tunali (1986) who specifically derives the likelihood function in 
the case of two selection equations with partial observability.  
 
The model consists of three equations: 
 
 
A2.3                                  equation  selection  constraintcredit                 
A2.2                                       equation  selection debt  positive                  
A2.1                                                     debt      for  demand e        th          
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We observe the amount of debt demanded only when when 1== ii cl .  
We assume that ε1i, ε2i, and ε3i are distributed trivariate normal with zero mean and  
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The conditional expectation of  equation (A2.1) conditional on selection is: 
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where φ is the standard univariate normal density, Φ is the standard univariate 
cumulative distribution, G is the standard bivariate normal cumulative distribution and 
ρ is the bivariate correlation coefficient between ε1i and  ε3i. 
 
Equations A2.1 and A2.2 form a bivariate probit with selection model, the likelihood 
function for which is: 
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Maximisation of A2.7  gives consistent estimates of  γ1, γ3, and ρ. These can be 
inserted into A2.5 and A2.6 to give 
ii 1εε
λ  and 
ii 3εε
λ . These lambda values can then be 
inserted into the A2.4 to derive the regression equation for A2.1: 
 
iiiiiiiii
d
i xd 3311 εεεεεεεε λσλσβ ++′=               A2.8 
 
which can be consistently estimated using OLS.  
 
The usual estimates of the standard errors will be inconsistent. We estimate the 
standard errors by bootstrapping the estimates 1000 times. That is, samples of size 
equal to the entire sample, were randomly selected with replacement . For each such 
replication the parameters of equation A2.8 were estimated and the standard deviation 
of these estimates for each parameter computed. This standard deviation is taken to be 
the standard error of the original estimate of the parameter. 
Appendix 3 
Bivariate Probit (with Selection) Selection Equation Model for US Demand 
Equation 
   Desires Positive Debt              Is Not Credit Constrained 
                                           coeff  z stat          coeff                    z stat         
 
wealth   -0.033               -10.34**  0.019  6.06**  
      
income 1   0.048   2.81**  0.033  1.62 
income 2    0.772   9.11**  0.313  3.23** 
income 3    0.184   1.49  0.544  4.53** 
income 4    0.172   1.49  0.396  3.37** 
income 5   -0.108     -2.00*  0.207  2.90** 
income 6   -0.127  -4.64**                -0.058                -1.23 
 
inc-perm inc  -0.002  -1.38                -0.009                -4.68** 
 
age 1    0.015   1.66  0.011  1.23 
age 2   -0.001   0.10  0.016  2.69** 
age 3   -0.011  -1.86  0.006  0.99 
age 4   -0.028  -7.57**                -0.002                -0.38 
age 5   -0.039               -11.99**  0.003  0.33 
 
ed1    na    
ed2        
ed3   -0.264  -2.95**                 0.001                 0.01 
ed4   -0.148  -1.99*                -0.188                -2.00* 
ed5   -0.122                      -1.57                      -0.222                -2.30* 
ed6   -0.085  -1.08                -0.082                -0.82 
 
no kids ≤ 6yrs   0.033   1.34                -0.024                -1.02 
no kids 7-12   0.021   0.84                -0.058                -2.49* 
no kids 13-19   0.122   4.81**                -0.046                -1.91 
no kids 20+   0.187   5.83**  0.027  0.76 
 
unemployed  -0.541  -8.34**                -0.001                -0.01  
no paid job  -0.443  -6.21**  0.205  1.94 
retired   -0.326  -7.35**  0.211  2.36* 
disabled   -0.375  -6.13**                -0.140                -1.72 
otherjob   -0.241  -1.73                -0.019                -0.11   
selfemployed   0.028   0.80                -0.100                -2.58** 
years at job      0.009  4.54**   
 
female    0.063   1.50  0.121  2.50*   
single   -0.380  -8.10**                -0.120                -2.16* 
divorced/wid  -0.104  -2.42**                -0.206                -4.08** 
single parent  -0.210  -2.96**                -0.290                -3.66** 
att vacation   0.151   4.07** 
att expenses   0.017   0.66 
att luxuries   0.066   1.21 
att cars    0.406  13.17** 
att education   0.061    1.89  
white    0.117    3.56**  0.324  9.64** 
default                     -0.765             -14.30**  
no of accounts                    -0.012               -2.44* 
welfare       0.011  0.20 
 
dyr95   -0.003  -0.08  0.064  1.66   
dyr98   -0.008  -0.23  0.033  0.86 
dyr01   -0.037  -1.08  0.064  1.65 
    
Constant   -0.120  -0.42                -0.810                -2.58**   
Nobs      16260 
Rho            0.568        (13.97)**    
         
Ref      scfmerge\tobit\t24q.log 
Notes: The LR test of Rho is distributed Chi squared (1). Number of uncensored observations (cases with debt ≤ 0 ) is 12218.  
Money values in 1992 Euros. * denotes significance at 5%, ** denotes significance at 1%. Income, wealth and (income – 
permanent income) are ln(x+1) if x ≥ 0, -ln(-x+1) if x < 0. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
Stylized Certainty Equivalent Models  with non-zero 
Borrowing Constraint 
 Table 1 
Precautionary Model, Benchmark Parameters 
 
_____________________________________________________________ 
     Parameter  Value    Description 
_____________________________________________________________ 
s   25   age of start of economic life 
tR   65   retirement age 
T   85   terminal period 
γ   2   relative risk aversion 
δ   0.02   time preference rate 
R   1.02  return on assets 
G   1.02   income growth 
α  0.75   replacement rate 
Yp0   20   initial value permanent income 
A0  0   initial asset level 
B  0   borrowing constraint, if imposed 
ση  0.10   permanent shock 
σ∈   0.10   transitory shock 
N   1000   number of sample paths 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Table 2 
Precautionary Model: Simulation Results 
 
                                             _____________________________________________ 
 Benchmark (Table 1) 
 age   30  40  50  60  70 
                                            ______________________________________________ 
holds any debt   %   81.1  73.4  23.3  0.2  0.0 
constrained   %   17.6  2.5  0.0 0.0  0.0 
avg. debt/avg. income    0.197  0.235  0.041  0.000  0.000 
indiv. debt/income  mean   0.207  0.267  0.058  0.001  0.000 
(unconditional)   median   0.183  0.200  0.000  0.000  0.000 
stddv      0.183  0.281  0.152 0.014  0.000 
debt/income  mean   0.256  0.364 0.247  0.312  0.000 
(if debt > 0)  median   0.233  0.312  0.185  0.312 0.000 
stddv      0.170  0.269 0.230  0.018 0.000 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
  Benchmark, but α = 0.65     Benchmark, but G = 1.015 
_________________________________________________                ______________________________________ 
age     30 40 50 60 70   30 40 50  60 70 
holds any debt   %   65.5  37.2  1.6  0.0  0.0    11.5  1.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
constrained   %   13.6  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0    3.9  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
avg. debt/avg. income    0.125  0.072  0.001  0.000 0.000    0.011  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000 
indiv. debt/income  mean   0.133  0.085  0.002  0.000 0.000    0.012  0.001  0.000 0.000  0.000 
(unconditional)  median   0.086  0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000    0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
stddv      0.153  0.166  0.019  0.000  0.000    0.046  0.017  0.000  0.000 0.000 
debt/income  mean  0.202  0.228  0.106  0.000  0.000    0.101 0.136 0.000  0.000 0.000 
(if debt > 0)  median   0.179 0.178  0.062  0.000  0.000    0.070  0.108  0.000  0.000 0.000 
stddv      0.146  0.204 0.109  0.000  0.000    0.096 0.110  0.000  0.000  0.000 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 Benchmark, but ση = σ∈ = 0.075    Benchmark, but γ = 3 
______________________________________                ________________________________________ 
 age 30  40  50        60         70      30  40        50          60         70 
holds any debt            %     100.0   100.0    100.0  77.5  4.5    12.6  1.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
constrained                 %  55.6  29.0  0.6  0.0  0.0    3.9 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
avg. debt/avg. income    0.851  1.656  1.399  0.258  0.005    0.011  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000 
ind. debt/income  mean   0.874  1.752  1.543  0.371  0.014    0.012  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000 
(unconditional)  median   0.863  1.710  1.444  0.265  0.000    0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
stddv      0.202  0.434  0.525  0.399  0.086    0.046  0.017  0.000  0.000  0.000 
debt/income  mean   0.874  1.752  1.543  0.479  0.309    0.097  0.143  0.000  0.000  0.000 
(if debt > 0)  median   0.863  1.710  1.444  0.372  0.229    0.069  0.113  0.000  0.000  0.000 
stddv      0.202  0.434  0.525  0.392  0.275    0.095  0.102  0.000  0.000  0.000 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Benchmark, but δ = 0.03     Benchmark, but R = 1.03 
____________________________________                    ________________________________________ 
age    30  40  50  60  70    30  40  50  60  70 
holds any debt  %    99.9  100.0  100.0  64.6  12.7    11.8  1.0 0.0  0.0  0.0 
constrained   %   32.6  13.8  0.5  0.0  0.0    3.9  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
avg. debt/avg. income    0.645  1.237  1.017  0.177  0.014    0.011  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000 
ind. debt/income  mean   0.677  1.365  1.204  0.305  0.042    0.012  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000 
(unconditional)  median   0.658  1.293  1.095  0.139  0.000    0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
stddv      0.248  0.492  0.589  0.423  0.169    0.047  0.017  0.000  0.000  0.000 
debt/income  mean   0.677  1.365  1.204  0.473  0.330    0.102  0.130  0.000  0.000  0.000 
(if debt > 0)  median   0.659  1.293  1.095  0.335  0.206    0.072  0.104  0.000  0.000  0.000 
stddv      0.247  0.492  0.589  0.446  0.360    0.097  0.110  0.000  0.000  0.000 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note: All rows except ‘constrained’ based on model without liquidity constraints imposed. 
‘Constrained’: calculated from model with liquidity constraints imposed. Constrained means: cash on hand lower than 110% of consumption. 
Table 3 
Household Debt in OECD Countries 
 
 
Country         Liabilities       Residential Mortgage Debt 
                                 (percent of disposable                        (percent of GDP) (2) 
                                                   income) (1) 
   1995  2005   1992  2002 
 
Denmark  112.9  155.2   63.9  74.3 
Netherlands  63.4  134.1   40.0  78.8 
Portugal  49.8  112.6   12.8  49.8 
US   78.8  111.1   45.3  58.0 
Spain   47.4  93.5   11.9  32.3 
Germany  74.3  83.2   38.7  54.0 
Sweden  54.7  78.3   37.5  40.4 
France   47.8  65.2   21.0  22.8 
Finland  47.2  58.6   37.2  31.8 
Belgium  45.7  54.2   19.9  27.9 
Greece   8.6  44.9   4.0  13.9 
Italy   24.6  43.1   6.3  11.4 
 
Japan   na  na   25.3  36.8 
Ireland   na  na   20.5  36.5 
Luxembourg  na  na   23.9  17.5 
 
 
(1) Calculated from OECD Financial Accounts Table IIIb Balance Sheets and from OECD National 
Accounts, Table 3. Disposable income is net national disposable  income. Households include 
non-profit institutions serving households. 
 
(2)  OECD June 2004/2 No 76 December.
Table 4a 
Incidence of Household Debt Holdings by Type of Debt (Percentage of Households that Possess each type) 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
             Mortgage Debt                  Other debt                            Total 
  Netherlands Italy Spain US  Netherlands Italy Spain US  Netherlands Italy Spain US 
 
1991    11.0      14.1      23.0   
1992   41.7      64.7      73.5 
1993  40.7  12.5     46.1  15.0    64.9  25.1 
1994  39.3       43.6      64.1 
1995  41.2  13.4  43.4   43.0  14.1  66.2  64.5  24.6  74.7 
1996  42.8       44.1      66.4 
1997  43.4        43.8      66.4 
1998  43.1  9.1  45.3   43.1  16.4  63.7  66.6  22.9  74.3 
1999  42.7        42.6      67.3 
2000  43.7  9.2     44.3  16.5    67.3  23.1 
2001  42.7    46.6   40.0    64.2  65.3    75.5 
2002  43.7  10.2 26.7     43.0  13.9 24.4   67.9  21.4 43.6 
2003  41.4        42.2      66.7 
2004  42.9  11.9   49.3    37.8  15.0  65.8  66.3  23.5                76.7 
2005  43.1        31.1      61.4    
2006  41.8        29.6      59.7     
Italy (SHIW): Figures for mortgages are debt outstanding to purchase or restructuring of buildings only and so may underestimate the total debt outstanding on mortgages. Figures for other debt 
and total exclude debt owed to relatives and friends. US (SCF): Figures for mortgages include mortgages, home equity loans and home equity lines of credit on the principal residence, loans on 
other residential property and debt on non-residential real estate. Netherlands (DHS): Figures for mortgages include all types of debt on residential and non-residential real estate. 
Spain (EFF): Figures for mortgages include mortgages and other types of loans to buy the household’s main residence and mortgages and other loans to buy other real estate. 
All values use sampling weights. 
 Table 4b 
Mean Household Debt Holdings by Type of Debt (1992 Euros) 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
             Mortgage Debt               Other debt                      Total 
  Netherlands Italy Spain US  Netherlands Italy Spain US  Netherlands Italy Spain US 
 
1991    1749      1436      3185  
1992      35374      6821      42194 
1993  30247  2175    4040  1721    34292  3897 
1994  27232      3467      30708 
1995  28973  2246  35514  3581  1649  7648  32558  3895  43161 
1996  30201      3675      33886 
1997  30803      3646      34457 
1998  27759  1658  41276  2892  2919  10347  30659  4576  51623 
1999  29908      3244      33166 
2000  34772  2210    3554  2377    37847  4587 
2001  33389    45243  4011    9545  37342    54788 
2002  37312  2559 8259   3403  2005 2041   40722  4564 10300 
2003  34712      4412      39077 
2004  36021  3732  63040  4186  2305  11250  40301  6037  74290 
2005  36873      3169      40041 
2006  36609      2362      38693 
See notes to Table 4a. 
 Table 4c 
Median Household Debt Holdings by Type of Debt (1992 Euros) Conditional on Holding Debt 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
             Mortgage Debt               Other debt                      Total 
  Netherlands Italy Spain US  Netherlands Italy Spain US  Netherlands Italy Spain US 
 
1991    10863      4888      5974    
1992      53154      5398      21262 
1993  60353  11373    3363  3214    36302  6428 
1994  58084      3096      33945 
1995  58138  11302  56546  3122  3164  6198  36175  6871  24141 
1996  58686      2876      38019 
1997  57896      2915      37219 
1998  50577  12545  64052  2733  4182  7778  32370  6272  33958 
1999  55537      3174      35703 
2000  63268  16039    2911  4010    37456  6416  
2001  60529    70182  3488    7860  37115    36962 
2002  65417  18438 24459   2841  4425 4289   36201  7375 16011 
2003  68668      2627      35568 
2004  68191  24368  85098  2768  4214  9124  35517  8778  49129 
2005  71685      2688      47043 
2006  75039      2943      47083 
See notes to Table 4a. 
Table 5 Constrained Households 
 
       Percentage who Apply(1)          Percentage who are rejected    Percentage who are rejected   Percentage who are rejected  
              
(1)(3)
    or discouraged(1)(3)    conditional on application(2) 
 
      Netherlands Italy Spain US   Netherlands  Italy Spain US Netherlands Italy Spain US     Netherlands  Italy    Spain    US 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
1991          0.9     3.3 
 
1992         22.5     27.8 
 
1993  22.4    0.8    1.1    2.4 3.0   4.2  
 
1995  19.8 5.6  63.6 0.9    0.9  20.4  2.9 2.3  28.6 4.5    16.2    32.0 
 
1998  21.2 6.0  63.6 0.8    0.5  21.8  3.1 2.8  28.4 3.9     7.7    34.2 
 
2000  25.7 5.4   1.7    0.4    2.8 1.7   4.3     8.0 
 
2001  26.1   64.9 1.5   19.9  2.3   26.9 3.7     30.7 
 
2002  24.9 4.2 20.8  2.5    0.5   1.1   3.5 2.2 3.4  9.1    11.7     5.1 
 
2004  20.9 4.7  68.7 1.7    0.6  20.9  2.9 2.7  27.8 4.5    11.9    30.5 
 
2006  23.8    2.7     3.7    9.4    
                   
   
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
All values are weighted proportions 
(1) denominator is all households.  
(2) denominator is all households that applied. 
(3) those who were rejected or who gained only part of the amount they applied for. Those who were not rejected, or who did not gain only part of the amount they applied for, may not 
have applied for credit. 
 
Time periods covered: Netherlands and Spain: any time in the two years preceding the survey, Italy: any time during the year preceding survey year, US: any time during  the five years 
preceding the survey year. In the US and in the Netherlands it is possible for a household to have applied for credit and to have been discouraged; in Italy the questionnaire does not allow for 
this: a household may only be discouraged if it did not apply. 
 
Table 6a 
Demographics Conditional On Debt Holding 
(Mean values or Percentages) 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
     Netherlands        Italy     Spain 
 
   1993  1998  2003   1991  1995  2000  2004  2002 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Age   44.10  48.82  47.24   46.01  46.06  44.91  45.06  45.01  
Family size  2.64  2.61  2.39   3.48  3.44  3.22  3.08  3.37 
Paid job (%)  68.9  59.9  63.4   59.6  50.2  55.4  63.1  57.2 
Unemployed (%) 2.8  2.7  3.6   3.7  3.3  0.76  0.53  7.2 
Retired  (%)  11.2  19.0  16.2   13.8  12.7  12.3  11.9  8.7 
No paid job (%) 5.2  3.3  4.1   0.03  3.0  0.57  0.31  10.9 
Disabled (%)  3.2  5.9  8.1   1.9  3.7  1.4  1.4  2.3 
Other job (%)  3.2  4.3  1.0   0.18  0  0.04  0  0.26 
Self employed (%) 5.3  5.1  3.8   24.1  27.0  29.5  22.8  13.4 
Single (%)  12.5  16.6  19.0   5.5  4.9  13.8  14.9  9.9 
Divorced (%)  9.4  11.3  11.2   8.4  9.5  9.4  11.5  6.0 
Married (%)  78.1  72.1  69.3   86.1  85.6  76.8  73.6  84.1 
Female  (%)  18.7  15.8  24.5   10.6  15.0  18.4  18.5  28.2 
Number of kids  0.824  0.838  0.685   1.48  1.45  1.28  1.19  1.35 
Education1 (%)  1.7  1.8  1.2   na        na 
Education2 (%)  7.1  4.5  4.3   26.9  24.4  15.1  12.5  27.0 
Education3 (%)  23.0  19.8  22.4   33.9  34.2  33.7  30.6  16.0 
Education4 (%)  17.5  13.2  13.0   30.9  32.9  40.2  45.4  14.9 
Education 5 (%) 9.7  21.3  17.4   na        23.4 
Education 6 (%) 41.1  39.4  41.7   8.2  8.5  11.0  11.6  18.7 
Total income  27117  23471  22042   24700  23506  25565  24990  20798 
Net Worth  102438  106502  110548   152237  166728  171525  182639  177594 
Table 6a (contd) 
Demographics Conditional On Debt Holding 
(Mean values or Percentages) 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
           US 
 
     1992   1995   1998   2001   2004 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Age     44.92   44.86   45.07   45.67   46.90 
Family size    2.72   2.66   2.71   2.67   2.62 
Paid job (%)    63.2   67.2   68.4   68.9   66.7 
Unemployed (%)   5.5   3.5   2.9   2.0   2.7 
Retired  (%)    10.8   10.3   10.3   10.2   11.7 
No paid job (%)   3.1   2.5   1.7   1.8   1.4 
Disabled (%)    4.6   3.5   3.5   4.1   4.6 
Other job (%)    0.11   1.9   0.47   0.23   0.46 
Self employed  (%)   12.4   11.1   12.7   12.9   12.5 
Single (%)    16.4   17.0   16.5   15.4   16.7 
Divorced (%)    20.0   19.2   18.1   18.7   20.7 
Married (%)    64.0   63.8   65.4   65.9   62.8 
Female  (%)    23.3   24.4   22.3   22.5   24.7 
Number of kids    0.82   0.79   0.82   0.79   0.76 
Education1    na      
Education2 (%)    3.4   2.2   2.5   2.7   1.9 
Education3 (%)    3.8   3.6   2.3   2.8   2.2 
Education4 (%)    37.4   39.8   40.5   39.2   36.6 
Education 5 (%)   19.6   20.4   16.7   17.9   19.1 
Education 6 (%)   35.9   34.0   38.0   37.4   40.2 
Total Income    53351   53496   61097   70689   66590 
Net worth    221370   222791   288453   352311   364889 
 
Table 6b 
Demographics All Cases 
(Mean values or Percentages) 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
     Netherlands                Italy    Spain 
   1993  1998  2003   1991  1995  2000  2004  2002 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Age   46.12  49.23  48.32   52.44  54.03  53.17  53.80  52.53 
Family size  2.44  2.42  2.29   3.06  2.89  2.71  2.58  2.94 
Paid job (%)  58.8  57.2  60.9   48.4  36.1  44.1  46.4  41.9 
Unemployed (%) 3.2  2.9  2.6   1.0  3.9  1.5  1.17  6.1 
Retired  (%)  18.1  21.5  17.9   30.4  32.1  29.7  30.5  23.0 
No paid job (%) 7.2  5.1  5.6   0.23  3.4  1.7  1.7  15.5 
Disabled (%)  4.3  5.2  7.9   6.9  10.3  8.5  7.0  3.0 
Other job (%)  4.1  5.1  1.8   0.25  0.01  0.09  0  0.35 
Self employed (%) 4.7  4.4  3.8   12.7  14.1  14.4  13.2  10.2 
Single (%)  16.9  20.5  22.2   6.8  8.4  16.4  17.4  14.2 
Divorced (%)  13.5  15.1  12.7   17.5  20.7  19.9  23.2  14.6 
Married (%)  69.6  64.4  65.1   75.7  70.8  63.7  59.4  71.2 
Female (%)  23.4  20.2  26.0   19.0  27.9  28.2  30.2  33.9 
Number of kids  0.709  0.722  0.631   1.17  1.05  0.916  0.821  1.04 
Education1  2.2  2.8  1.2   na        na 
Education2 (%)  9.5  4.9  5.3   43.6  43.0  33.4  30.3  41.1 
Education3 (%)  28.5  23.4  23.6   25.8  26.9  27.6  28.8  15.1 
Education4 (%)  16.0  13.2  12.6   23.4  23.7  29.8  31.7  11.2 
Education 5 (%) 9.8  18.8  17.9   na        17.6 
Education 6 (%) 34.0  36.8  39.5   7.2  6.4  9.1  9.1  15.1 
Total income(1)  23212  21434  20924   21097  19354  20260  20706  16934 
Net Worth  88602  93137  100130   118133  126769  140208  154246  168543 
(1)Total income relates to the following years: NL: previous year;  Italy:  year as indicated, US and Spain:  previous year. 
All monetary values in 1992 Euros. NL: income is total net household income, Italy: income is net disposable income, US and Spain: gross income.  
For education categories, refer to Data Appendix. Sampling weights used. 
Table 6b (contd) 
Demographics All Cases 
(Mean values or Percentages) 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
           US 
 
     1992   1995   1998   2001   2004  
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Age     48.43   48.45   48.73   48.97   49.56 
Family size    2.50   2.49   2.50   2.49   2.46 
Paid job (%)    54.0   57.1   58.5   59.95   59.26 
Unemployed (%)   5.6   4.1   3.4   2.6   2.9 
Retired  (%)    18.1   17.9   18.9   17.9   18.0 
No paid job (%)   5.4   3.5   2.6   2.5   2.1 
Disabled (%)    5.7   4.3   5.0   5.0   5.6 
Other job (%)    0.08   3.0   0.40   0.27   0.55 
Self employed (%)   10.6   10.1   11.1   11.8   11.6 
Single (%)    18.0   17.8   18.6   17.2   18.0 
Divorced (%)    24.5   23.6   22.8   22.2   24.2 
Married (%)    57.5   58.5   58.6   60.5   57.8 
Female  (%)    27.8   28.8   27.9   26.7   28.1 
Number of kids    0.70   0.69   0.69   0.69   0.67 
Education1    na      
Education2 (%)    4.3   3.2   3.4   3.3   3.3 
Education3 (%)    6.0   5.7   3.7   4.3   3.5 
Education4 (%)    38.8   41.0   41.9   40.0   37.7 
Education 5    19.1   19.3       17.7   18.3   19.0 
Education 6 (%)   31.7   30.8   33.3   34.2   36.5 
Total Income    47409   48919   54119   64842   61695 
Net worth    217401   234510   284250   371996   385383 
Table 7 
The Credit Application and Granting Decisions 
 
 
Desired Wants        Discour        Applies      Rejected      Observed  Applies to 
Holding/  non-zero     aged           Holding/   Stock Flow 
Flow                Flow 
______________________________________________________________________ 
d>0  yes  no         yes no  d>0 yes yes 
d>0  yes  no         yes yes  0 yes yes 
d>0  yes  yes         no na  0 yes yes 
0  no  na         no na  0 yes yes 
 
d<0  yes  na         na na  0 yes no 
d<0  yes  na         na na  d<0 no yes
Table 8 
Probability of Applying for a Loan 
Marginal Effects 
                 Netherlands   Italy           US         Spain 
            Random Effects  Random Effects     Pooled         2002 
 
wealth            -0.0061**  -0.0030**  -0.0025* -0.0172** 
                                                        
income 1            0.0138   0.0033   0.0212**  0.0341 
income 2            0.1253*    0.0514**   0.3083**  0.1089* 
income 3            0.1128  -0.0311   0.0855  0.0904 
income 4            0.1220    0.0209   0.0475  0.0915 
income 5            0.1127    0.0234  -0.0751**  0.0262 
income 6            0.0545*    0.0080  -0.0343**  0.0293 
 
inc-perm inc      -0.0021**    0.0001    0.0006 -0.0016 
 
age < 30            0.0078   -0.0006  -0.0056 -0.0026 
30 = age < 40   -0.0072**    0.0002  -0.0044 -0.0076** 
40 = age < 50   -0.0068**  -0.0010*  -0.0072**  0.0002 
50 = age <65      -0.0084**  -0.0018**  -0.0122** -0.0038** 
65 = age          -0.0076**  -0.0023**  -0.0194** -0.0100** 
 
ed1                -0.0255   na  na na 
ed3                 0.0025   0.0008  -0.0408 -0.0008 
ed4                 0.0238  -0.0003   0.0328 -0.0098 
ed5                 0.0185   na   0.0620*  0.0021 
ed6                0.0032  -0.0021   0.0627* -0.0261 
 
no kids <= 6yrs    -0.0057    0.0036  -0.0080  0.0086 
no kids 7-12        0.0013    0.0066**  -0.0066  0.0192 
no kids 13-19     -0.0017    0.0067**   0.0131  0.0144 
no kids 20+         0.0069    0.0062**   0.0088  0.0235** 
 
unemployed        -0.0486*    0.0003  -0.1724**  0.0446* 
no paid job       -0.0618**  -0.0107  -0.1285**  0.0246 
retired            -0.0080    0.0082  -0.0686**  -0.0060 
disabled          -0.0344  -0.0072  -0.1393** -0.0060 
otherjob          -0.0374  -0.0255  -0.0465  0.1560 
selfemployed        0.0040    0.0035   0.0085  0.0021 
female            -0.0120    0.0012  -0.0278 -0.0310* 
single            -0.1009**  -0.0051  -0.0784** -0.0379** 
divorced/wid      -0.0161    0.0043   0.0127 -0.0172 
single parent       0.0294  -0.0085  -0.0899**  0.0562* 
 
Nobs               18,912          20,230         12540  5087 
Rho              0.427  1087.73   0.189  60.25            
 
Pseudo R2             0.180   2929   0.136  592 
 
 
Rho = )1( 22 +uu σσ  random effects variance as fraction of total error variance; test statistic is chi-squared. 
Notes for Netherlands and Italy: Regional dummies included, but not reported. 
Notes for United States: Sample is for years 1995, 1998 & 2001.  
Notes for Italy: Sample is all households for which observations existed in at least two adjacent surveys (1995 & 
1998 or 2000 & 1998 or 2000 & 2002 or 2002 & 2004).  
Notes for all countries: intercept and time effects included but not reported. Excluded categories: education: level 
2 ( level 1 not available for Italy, US or Spain and level 5 also not available for Italy); marital status: married;  
occupational status: paid job. Income: linear spline; all money values in 1992 Euros.  
Income, wealth and (income – permanent income) are ln(x+1) if x ≥ 0, -ln(-x+1) if x < 0. 
* denotes significance at 5%, ** denotes significance at 1%.  
 Table 9a 
Credit Constraint Equations Models (Probits) 
Rejected or gained only part of amount applied for, conditional on application 
 
Marginal Effects 
            Netherlands Italy             US   
       Random Effects Random Effects          Pooled 
 
wealth            -0.0008**  -9.33*10-6  -0.0091** 
                                                       
income 1    0.0055  -0.0230   0.0087 
income 2           -0.0062  -0.1407**  -0.0656 
income 3           -0.0492  -0.0214  -0.1435** 
income 4           -0.0148  -0.1278  -0.2121** 
income 5            0.0121  -0.0007  -0.0816** 
income 6           -0.0283  -0.1115  -0.0089 
 
inc-perm inc       0.0005   0.0028**   0.0049** 
 
age < 30            0.0011   0.0040  -0.0020 
30 = age < 40     -0.0007   0.0012  -0.0098** 
40 = age < 50      0.0011   0.0014  -0.0005 
50 = age <65      -0.0013*   0.0010  -0.0003 
65 = age          -0.0004   0.0024  -0.0069* 
 
ed1                 0.0164   na  na 
ed3                -0.0022   0.0138   0.0792 
ed4                 0.0060  -0.0035   0.1679** 
ed5                 0.0020  -0.0037   0.1796**  
ed6               -0.0038     0.1364** 
 
no kids <= 6yrs     0.0035   0.0139   0.0129 
no kids 7-12       -0.0030   0.0269**   0.0336** 
no kids 13-19     -0.0004   0.0088   0.0414** 
no kids 20+         0.0037   0.0115  -0.0171 
 
unemployed         0.0217   0.0847  -0.0242 
no paid job        0.0457**   0.0247  -0.1016** 
retired             0.0021  -0.0082  -0.0821** 
disabled           0.0798**  -0.0047   0.0864* 
otherjob           0.0335*     0.0001 
selfemployed        0.0136   0.0039   0.0239 
female             0.0031  -0.0018  -0.0384* 
single            -0.0007   0.1546**   0.0036 
divorced/wid       0.0015   0.0138   0.0344 
single parent      -0.0057  -0.0244   0.0674*  
 
Nobs              4571          1089            8109 
Rho              0.276 35.63    0.228  1.35 
Pseudo R2                                    0.132   1268 
 
 
 
Note for Italy: Sample is all household-years for which observations were available in at least 2 adjacent years 
(1995 & 1998 or 1998 & 2000 or 2000 & 2002 or 2002 & 2004) and the household applied for credit in that 
questionnaire year. Since very few households indicated they applied in two successive questionnaires, the mean 
number of year observations per household is only 1.2. 
Note for US: Sample is for  households from surveys in 1995, 1998 & 2001 that applied for credit.  
Notes for all countries: intercept and time effects included but not reported. Excluded categories: education: level 
2 ( level 1 not available for Italy, US or Spain and level 5 also not available for Italy); marital status: married;  
occupational status: paid job. Income: linear spline; all money values in 1992 Euros.  
Income, wealth and (income – permanent income) are ln(x+1) if x ≥ 0, -ln(-x+1) if x < 0. 
* denotes significance at 5%, ** denotes significance at 1%.  
     Table 9b 
Credit Constraint Equations Models (Probits) 
Rejected Or Gained Only Part Of Amount Applied For Conditional On 
Application, Or Discouraged Conditional On Not Applying 
 
Marginal Effects 
 
                Netherlands     Italy           US  Spain 
           Random Effects     Random Effects    Pooled  2002 
 
wealth            -0.0004**  -0.0011**  -0.0080** -0.0033** 
                          
income 1    0.0007   0.0011   0.0044 -0.0067 
income 2           -0.0093*  -0.0028   0.0006 -0.0109 
income 3           -0.0175  -0.0129  -0.1111**  0.0018 
income 4            0.0006  -0.0096  -0.1405** -0.0011 
income 5            0.0082   0.0056  -0.0663** -0.0164 
income 6           -0.0057  -0.0079  -0.0128 -0.0070 
 
inc-perm inc       0.0002**   0.0003**   0.0033** -0.0004 
 
age < 30            0.0003  -0.0002  -0.0022 -0.0015 
30 = age < 40     -0.0004*   0.0003  -0.0078**  0.0001 
40 = age < 50      0.0002  -0.0006*  -0.0016  0.0000 
50 = age < 65      -0.0004**  -0.0002  -0.0036** -0.0002 
65 = age          -0.0003  -0.0008**  -0.0116** -0.0003 
 
ed1                -0.0010   na   na  na 
ed3                -0.0016   0.0048   0.0174**      -0.0125** 
ed4                -0.0007  -0.0034   0.0771** -0.0124** 
ed5                -0.0008   na   0.0992** -0.0038 
ed6               -0.0041*  -0.0001   0.0567* -0.0140** 
 
no kids <= 6yrs     0.0004   0.0027   0.0056  0.0030 
no kids 7-12       -0.0002   0.0036**   0.0252**  0.0016 
no kids 13-19     -0.0001   0.0022   0.0342** -0.0051 
no kids 20+         0.0001   0.0028**   0.0011  0.0013 
 
unemployed         0.0040   0.0160**  -0.0255  0.0218* 
no paid job        0.0016   0.0020  -0.0861** -0.0036 
retired             0.0019   0.0029  -0.0658** -0.0016 
disabled           0.0127**  -0.0042   0.0151 -0.0039 
otherjob           0.0069*  -0.0091  -0.0034 -0.0035 
selfemployed        0.0085**   0.0017   0.0182 -0.0004 
female             0.0016  -0.0014  -0.0178  0.0002 
single            -0.0026**   0.0032  -0.0101 -0.0013 
divorced/wid      -0.0001   0.0036   0.0267*  0.0075 
single parent       0.0027  -0.0039   0.0605**   0.0065 
 
Nobs              18,896            20,230        12,540       5,087        
Rho               0.286  129.01   0.191 20.20 
Pseudo R2                                         0.170 2242   0.136 158 
 
 
Note for Italy: Sample is all household-years for which observations were available in at least 2 adjacent years 
(1995 & 1998 or 1998 & 2000 or 2000 & 2002 or 2002 & 2004).  
Note for US: Sample is for  households from surveys in 1995, 1998 & 2001.  
Notes for all countries: intercept and time effects included but not reported. Excluded categories: education: level 
2 ( level 1 not available for Italy, US or Spain and level 5 also not available for Italy); marital status: married;  
occupational status: paid job. Income: linear spline; all money values in 1992 Euros.  
Income, wealth and (income – permanent income) are ln(x+1) if x ≥ 0, -ln(-x+1) if x < 0. 
* denotes significance at 5%, ** denotes significance at 1%.  
     Table 9c 
Credit Constraint Equations Models (Probits) 
Rejected Or Gained Only Part Of Amount Applied For, Or Discouraged 
Marginal Effects 
        Netherlands    US 
        Random Effects   Pooled  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
wealth            -0.0006**    -0.0097** 
                                                       
income 1           0.0016    -0.0007 
income 2           -0.0083     0.0158 
income 3           -0.0244*    -0.1623** 
income 4            0.0080    -0.1217** 
income 5            0.0067    -0.0698** 
income 6           -0.0098*     0.0003 
 
inc-perm inc       0.0002*     0.0034** 
 
age < 30            0.0002    -0.0013 
30 = age < 40     -0.0004    -0.0077** 
40 = age < 50      0.0002    -0.0036** 
50 = age <65      -0.0006**    -0.0054** 
65 = age          -0.0005    -0.0106** 
 
ed1                -0.0028    na 
ed3                -0.0015    -0.0259 
ed4                 0.0006     0.0523* 
ed5                -0.0007      0.0677**   
ed6               -0.0047*     0.0328 
 
no kids <= 6yrs     0.0005     0.0040 
no kids 7-12       -0.0001     0.0203** 
no kids 13-19      0.0003     0.0331** 
no kids 20+         0.0005     0.0135 
 
unemployed         0.0042    -0.0368* 
no paid job        0.0014    -0.0996** 
retired             0.0028    -0.0712** 
disabled           0.0175**     0.0131 
otherjob           0.0095*    -0.0060 
selfemployed        0.0093**     0.0325** 
female             0.0024    -0.0296** 
single            -0.0042**    -0.0164 
divorced/wid      -0.0023     0.0414** 
single parent       0.0084*     0.1088**  
 
Nobs               19,378                        16,260                                
Rho                0. 296  179.24            
Pseudo R2                                     0.176 3159 
 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note for US: Sample is for households from surveys in 1992, 1995, 1998 & 2001.  
Notes for all countries: intercept and time effects included but not reported. Excluded categories: education: level 
2 ( level 1 not available for Italy, US or Spain and level 5 also not available for Italy); marital status: married;  
occupational status: paid job. Income: linear spline; all money values in 1992 Euros.  
Income, wealth and (income – permanent income) are ln(x+1) if x ≥ 0, -ln(-x+1) if x < 0. 
* denotes significance at 5%, ** denotes significance at 1%.  
 
 
Table 10 
Debt Outstanding  
 
                  Netherlands Italy                   US      Spain 
RE Regression RE Regression       Pooled OLS         2 Stage Seln.  Tobit 
 
                   COEFF  z-value     COEFF  z-value     COEFF  z-value    COEFF  z-value  COEFF z-value 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
wealth            -0.029  -11.71**   -0.033   -4.59**   -0.009   -2.90**    0.010   1.70  -0.127 -1.29 
                                                                             
income 1          -0.030   -0.61     -0.113   -2.08*    -0.082   -3.23**   -0.075  -1.01   0.276 0.28 
income 2           0.883    4.99**    0.718    2.64**    1.966   18.09**    2.010  12.75**  5.746 2.99** 
income 3           1.684    6.29**    0.361    1.22      1.394   10.03**    1.448   8.72**  4.227 1.85 
income 4           0.392    1.50      0.329    1.18      1.248   10.17**    1.234   9.78**  0.874 0.39 
income 5           0.555    3.08**    0.301    1.38      0.976   15.56**    0.963  13.64**  2.396 1.53 
income 6           0.294    3.78**    0.646    6.06**    0.571   15.07**    0.519  10.36** -0.148 -0.24 
 
inc-perm inc      -0.010   -4.67**    0.001    0.21     -0.023  -11.31**   -0.021  -8.48**  0.032 0.96 
 
age < 30           0.180    8.81**   -0.011   -0.45      0.050    4.57**    0.039   2.55*   0.215  1.05 
30 <= age < 40     0.024    2.92**    0.014    1.52      0.006    0.82      0.009   1.11  -0.206 -2.07* 
40 <= age < 50    -0.002   -0.35     -0.023   -2.95**   -0.007   -1.13     -0.014  -2.31*  -0.195 -2.45* 
50 <= age < 65    -0.039   -6.48**   -0.017   -2.37*    -0.009   -1.85     -0.009  -1.55  -0.324 -5.96** 
65 <= age         -0.023   -2.78**   -0.011   -1.13     -0.055   -8.69**   -0.067  -5.87** -0.461 -7.37** 
 
ed1                0.266    1.53      na      na                  na                na 
ed3                0.226    2.15*     0.063    1.07     -0.547   -3.88**   -0.517  -2.72** -0.048 -0.09   
ed4                0.513    4.41**    0.326    5.18**   -0.194   -1.75     -0.217  -1.42    0.350  0.58 
ed5                0.421    3.67**    na                -0.206   -1.81     -0.220  -1.39   0.177  0.32 
ed6                0.682    6.20**    0.408    4.53**   -0.056   -0.49     -0.068  -0.44  -0.456 -0.77 
                                                                           
no kids <= 6yrs    0.104    3.33**   -0.021   -0.48      0.050    1.88      0.062   2.12*   1.654  3.98** 
no kids 7-12       0.039    1.28      0.026    0.67      0.043    1.65      0.059   2.38*   0.978  2.42* 
no kids 13-19      0.028    1.00     -0.039   -1.16      0.067    2.67**    0.058   2.26*  -0.146 -0.45 
no kids 20+       -0.051   -1.42      0.027    0.91      0.061    1.67      0.048   1.14   0.891  3.62** 
                                                                           
unemployed        -0.229   -2.90**   -0.058   -0.38     -0.077   -0.82     -0.114  -0.87   0.199  0.25 
no paid job        0.094   -1.07     -0.140   -0.97     -0.034   -0.30      0.162   1.01  -1.218 -1.73 
retired           -0.048   -0.79      0.104    1.39     -0.095   -1.38     -0.140  -1.46  -2.145 -3.23** 
disabled          -0.279   -3.60**   -0.020   -0.15      0.012    0.13      0.008   0.07  -2.037 -1.89 
otherjob          -0.236   -2.97**    0.448    1.02      0.096    0.46      0.163   0.78   2.072  0.81 
selfemployed       0.219    3.38**    0.658   13.61**    0.420   10.55**    0.384   8.88** -0.345 -0.69 
female            -0.321   -5.35**   -0.043   -0.73     -0.086   -1.51     -0.145  -2.08*  -0.472 -0.99 
single            -0.852  -12.78**   -0.354   -4.16**   -0.118   -1.90     -0.123  -1.50  -3.628 -6.12** 
divorced/wid      -0.395   -5.43**   -0.118   -1.28      0.063    1.10      0.071   1.03  -1.754 -2.41* 
single parent     -0.529   -4.86**   -0.057   -0.53     -0.181   -1.82     -0.244  -1.58   1.574  1.88 
 
lambda 1                                                                    0.251   1.31 
lambda 2                                                                    0.436   2.95**  
 
                 
Nobs               14018              6876               12218              9668   5087 
Rho                0.763             0.388                      
                 
R2                 0.2214             0.138             0.4724  0.4603   0.092 
 
 
Notes for Italy: Sam ple is all household-years for which observations were available in at least 2 adjacent years (1993 & 1995 or 1995 & 1998 or 1998 & 2000 or 2000 & 2002 or 2002 & 2004) and that have debt > 0. 
Notes for US: Equations also include the variable “white“ which is not available for the Netherlands or Italy. Sample is for all households in 1992, 1995, 1998 & 2001 surveys. Pooled estimates use sample where debt 
> 0. 2 stage selection estimates estimated using households that have debt > 0 and that are not credit constrained (with selection equations). 
Notes for Spain: Sample consists of all households with debt ≥ 0. All households with debt=0 are regarded as censored. 
 
 
